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ARTICLES
NEUROIMAGING AND THE
"COMPLEXITY" OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
0. CARTER SNEAD*
The growing use of brain imaging technology to explore the causes of morally,
socially, and legally relevant behavior is the subject of much discussion and contro-
versy in both scholarly and popular circles. From the efforts of cognitive neuros-
cientists in the courtroom and the public square, the contours of a project to
transform capital sentencing both in principle and in practice have emerged. In the
short term, these scientists seek to play a role in the process of capital sentencing by
serving as mitigation experts for defendants, invoking neuroimaging research on
the roots of criminal violence to support their arguments. Over the long term, these
same experts (and their like-minded colleagues) hope to appeal to the recent find-
ings of their discipline to embarrass, discredit, and ultimately overthrow retributive
justice as a principle of punishment. Taken as a whole, these short- and long-term
efforts are ultimately meant to usher in a more compassionate and humane regime
for capital defendants.
This Article seeks to articulate, analyze, and provide a critique of this project
according to the metric of its own humanitarian aspirations. It proceeds by
exploring the implications of the project in light of the mechanics of capital sen-
tencing and the heterogeneous array of competing doctrinal rationales in which
they are rooted. The Article concludes that the project as currently conceived is
internally inconsistent and would, if implemented, result in ironic and tragic conse-
quences, producing a death penalty regime that is even more draconian and less
humane than the deeply flawed framework currently in place.
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Till we have developed this sense of the complexity of punish-
ment..., we shall be in no fit state to assess the extent to which the
whole institution has been eroded by, or needs to be adapted to,
new beliefs about the human mind.1
- H.L.A. Hart
INTRODUCTION
"Can brain scans be used to determine whether a person is
inclined toward criminality or violent behavior? ' 2 This question,
asked by Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware at the hearing consid-
ering the nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the
United States, illustrates the extent to which cognitive neuros-
1 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1968).
2 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 18 (2005)
(statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). Senator
Biden may have been influenced by a contemporaneous article in the New York Times
Magazine speculating about the issues that might come before the Supreme Court in the
years to come, including "brain scanning to identify criminal suspects." Jeffrey Rosen,
Roberts v. the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
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cience3-increasingly augmented by the growing powers of
neuroimaging 4-has captured the imagination of those who make,
enforce, interpret, and study the law. Judges, both state and federal,
have convened conferences to discuss the legal ramifications of devel-
opments in cognitive neuroscience. 5 Scholarly volumes have been
devoted to the subject.6 The President's Council on Bioethics con-
vened several sessions to discuss cognitive neuroscience and its poten-
tial impact on theories of moral and legal responsibility. 7 The United
States General Accounting Office drafted a report surveying the views
of government officials representing the CIA, Department of
Defense, Secret Service, and FBI on the potential uses of "brain fin-
gerprinting," a lie detection technique that utilizes functional
neuroimaging. 8 More recently, civil libertarians have expressed suspi-
cion and concern that the United States government is using various
3 Cognitive neuroscience can be described as the science of how the brain enables the
mind. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE MIND'S PAST Xii (1998) ("How the brain
enables mind is the question to be answered in the twenty-first century .... ").
4 For an overview of neuroimaging techniques, including computed tomography (CT)
scanning, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), electroencephalography (EEG), positron
emission tomography (PET), single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), and
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), see infra Part I.B.
5 In June 2006, the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, the Federal
Judicial Center, the Dana Foundation, and the National Center for State Courts cospon-
sored the Judicial Seminar on Emerging Neuroscience Issues. The conference agenda and
presentations are available at NCSC: Research - Science, Technology and the Law, http://
www.ncsconline.org/d-research/stl/conferences-aaas.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2007). See
also Caryn Tamber, Brave Neuro World, DAILY REC. (Balt.), Dec. 30, 2005, at 1
(describing educational program for Maryland judges to increase understanding of
neuroimaging evidence).
6 E.g., NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW (Brent Garland ed., 2004); The Measurement of
Brain Activity, 354 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1119 (1999)
(compiling works studying neuroimaging and other brain activity measures as themed
issue); Symposium, The Mind of a Child: The Relationship Between Brain Development,
Cognitive Functioning, and Accountability Under the Law, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 317
(2006); see also The New Neuromorality, http://www.aei.org/events/eventlD.1072,filter.all/
event detail.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2007) (providing video and materials from June 1,
2005, American Enterprise Institute conference panel entitled "Legal and Moral Implica-
tions of the New Neuroscience," moderated by Christina Hoff Sommers with panelists
Joshua D. Greene, Stephen J. Morse, and Steven Pinker).
7 President's Council on Bioethics, Transcripts (April 1, 2004), http://www.bioethics.
gov/transcripts/april04/aprill.html; President's Council on Bioethics, Transcripts (June 25,
2004), http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/ une04/ une25.html.
8 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES: FEDERAL AGENCY
VIEWS ON THE POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF "BRAIN FINGERPRINTING" (2001). The report
concluded that federal law enforcement agencies did not foresee the use of "brain finger-
printing" given its limited applications and high cost. Id. at 8-10. For a discussion of evi-
dentiary questions arising from the use of both "brain fingerprinting" and related fMRI-
based lie detection techniques in the courtroom, see generally Charles N.W. Keckler,
Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeach-
ment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (2006).
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neuroimaging techniques in the war on terrorism. 9 Members of the
personal injury bar have urged the use of functional neuroimaging to
make "mild to moderate brain [and nervous] injuries ... visible [to]
jurors." 10 Not surprisingly, members of the civil defense bar have
published articles criticizing the reliability of such evidence and
arguing that it should be inadmissible. 1 Criminal defense attorneys
have likewise expressed a strong interest in using neuroimaging evi-
dence to help their clients.
12
The attraction of the legal community to cognitive neuroscience is
by no means unreciprocated. Cognitive neuroscientists have
expressed profound interest in how their discipline might impact the
law. Michael Gazzaniga, who coined the term "cognitive neuros-
cience, ''1 3 recently predicted that someday advances in neuroscience
will "dominate the entire legal system."
' 14
Practitioners of cognitive neuroscience seem particularly drawn
to the criminal law;15 more specifically, they have evinced an interest
in the death penalty. Indeed, a well-formed cognitive neuroscience
project to reform capital sentencing has emerged from their work in
the courtroom and their arguments in the public square.
This Article seeks to identify, articulate, take seriously, and pro-
vide a critique of this project in light of its own objectives. In Part I, it
sets forth a brief introductory discussion of cognitive neuroscience
9 See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Seeks Information About
Government Use of Brain Scanners in Interrogations (June 28, 2006), available at http://
www.aclu.org/privacy/medical/26035prs20060628.html (describing request submitted under
Freedom of Information Act to all "primary American security agencies" seeking informa-
tion about use of "cutting-edge brain-scanning technologies on suspected terrorists being
held overseas or at home"); see also Jennifer Wild, Brain Imaging Ready To Detect Ter-
rorists, Say Neuroscientists, 437 NATURE 457, 457 (2005) (discussing whether fMRI can be
effectively used as lie-detection method in criminal investigations).
10 Donald J. Nolan & Tressa A. Pankovits, High-Tech Proof in Brain Injury Cases,
TRIAL, June 1, 2005, at 27, 27.
11 E.g., J. Bruce Alverson & Sandra S. Smagac, Brain Mapping: Should This Contro-
versial Evidence Be Excluded?, 48 FED'N INS. CORP. COUNS. Q. 131 (1998); Brickford Y.
Brown et al., Are We Out of the Gray Area Yet? Recent Developments in the Use of PET
and SPECT Scans to Prove Causation and Injury in Toxic Tort Litigation, http://www.
morankikerbrown.com/CM/Articles/Articles67.asp (last visited June 30, 2007).
12 See infra Part I.C (citing and discussing criminal cases in which defense presented
neuroimaging evidence).
13 Silvia A. Bunge & Itamar Kahn, Cognition, Neuroimaging, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF NEUROSCIENCE (George Adelman & Barry H. Smith eds., Elsevier B.V. CD-ROM, 3d
ed. 2004).
14 MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN 88 (2005).
15 See, e.g., Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System,
359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI., 1787, 1788 (2004) ("Arguably,
the most important arena in which a greater knowledge of neuroscience is needed is the
criminal justice system.").
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generally, including its anchoring theoretical premise, its most pow-
erful technical adjunct (neuroimaging), and its present and projected
impact on the law, broadly understood. In Part II, it contemplates the
aspirations of cognitive neuroscientists vis-A-vis capital sentencing,
both in the short term and the long term.16 The Article notes that in
the short term, cognitive neuroscientists seek to assist defendants' mit-
igation claims by invoking cutting-edge brain imaging research on the
neurobiological roots of criminal violence. Neuroimaging experts
appeal to such evidence to bolster defendants' claims that, although
legally guilty, they do not deserve to die because the abnormal struc-
ture and/or function of their brains diminishes their culpability.
Part II.B further describes how, in the long term, cognitive
neuroscientists aim to draw upon the tools of their discipline to
embarrass, discredit, and ultimately overthrow retribution 17 as a dis-
16 This Article uses phrases such as "the cognitive neuroscience project" and "the aspi-
rations of cognitive neuroscience for capital sentencing" as administratively convenient
shorthand. The phrases refer to the views of a substantial body of eminent neuroscientists
and neuroimaging practitioners working in the field of capital sentencing who embrace the
aims described in this Article. It is not meant to imply that cognitive neuroscientists as a
whole are monolithic in their opinions on this matter. Indeed, they are not, and some have
expressed deep reservations about the use of neuroimaging in the courtroom. See, e.g.,
Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SCIENCE 596, 596-99
(2004) (noting that UCLA neuroscientist Paul Thompson suggests it is "damaging" and
premature to apply incipient findings in neuroscience to moral and legal societal questions
before neuroscience has sufficiently established its relevance to such questions, while
UCLA neuroscientist Elizabeth Sowell argues that neuroimaging is not sufficiently
advanced to connect behavior to brain structure); Bruce Bower, Teen Brains on Trial: The
Science of Neural Development Tangles with the Juvenile Death Penalty, 165 ScI. NEws 299,
301 (2004) (noting concerns of Bradley S. Peterson of Columbia College of Physicians and
Surgeons and B.J. Casey of Cornell University's Weill Medical College that neuroscience
and neuroimaging results are too crude and ambiguous to be applied to legal, social, or
political problems); Helen S. Mayberg, Medical-Legal Inferences from Functional
Neuroimaging Evidence, 1 SEMINARS IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY 195, 200 (1996)
(arguing that PET and SPECT scans "have no scientifically supportable exculpatory role in
assessing or predicting an individual's responsibility in the commission of a crime");
Donald Reeves et al., Limitations of Brain Imaging in Forensic Psychiatry, 31 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 89, 89-90, 95-96 (2003) (expressing worry that use of novel
neuroimaging techniques by forensic experts "may mislead a judge and jury" and
explaining several ways such evidence can be manipulated or overstated); Nicholas
Thompson, My Brain Made Me Do It, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 50, 52 (noting
Michael Gazzaniga's worries that defendants will try to use new neuroimaging technology
to generate exculpatory evidence in criminal context). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that, as
a whole, the cognitive neuroscience project encompasses a number of professionals in the
field who are working toward common goals for capital sentencing reform.
17 In this Article, "retribution," "retributive justice," and "just deserts" are used inter-
changeably to denote the concept that punishment should be distributed on the basis of the
personal blameworthiness of the offender, in light of relevant mitigating and aggravating
factors. See infra Part III.A (discussing Paul Robinson's account of "punishment according
to desert").
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tributive justification 18 for punishment. The architects of the cognitive
neuroscience project regard retribution as the root cause of the bru-
tality and inhumanity of the American criminal justice system, gener-
ally, and the institution of capital punishment, in particular. 19 To
replace retribution, they argue for the adoption of a criminal law
regime animated solely by the forward-looking (consequentialist) aim
of avoiding social harms. This new framework, they hope, will usher
in a new era of what some have referred to as "therapeutic justice"20
for capital defendants, which is meant to be both more humane and
more compassionate.
Part III offers a "friendly" critique of the cognitive neuroscience
project, taken as a whole. That is, the critique will not take its bear-
ings from the concern, raised by some, that the use of neuroimaging in
capital sentencing is an indefensible, soft-hearted prescription for
"universal neurological exculpation. ' 21 Nor will it argue that the pre-
sent and projected efforts of neuroscientists in this domain will be
simply another chapter in the long and arguably sordid history of the
science of "biological criminality. ' 22 Instead, this Article will analyze
the wisdom and soundness of the project according to the metric of
the project's own aspirations: pleading for the lives of capital defen-
dants at sentencing and, ultimately, creating a more compassionate
and humane sentencing regime. Thus, the critique is "friendly" in that
its point of departure is one of sympathy and solidarity with the
18 H.L.A. Hart distinguished the "General Justifying Aim" of punishment from its "dis-
tributive" principles. The former constitutes the ultimate legitimating goal of punishment,
whereas the latter is a limiting or qualifying principle that informs the scope of liability
(i.e., who may be punished) and the amount of punishment that may be meted out. See
HART, supra note 1, at 8-13 (applying distinction to retributive justice and concluding that
one need not hold retribution as sole justifying aim of punishment in order to accept its
limitations on scope and severity of such punishment).
19 See infra Part II.B.
20 E.g., Jana L. Bufkin & Vickie R. Luttrell, Neuroimaging Studies of Aggressive and
Violent Behavior: Current Findings and Implications for Criminology and Criminal Justice,
6 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 176, 186 (2005) ("Justice is typically defined as just deserts.
As a result, legal variables with no inherent explanatory worth are summoned to justify
less-than-stellar community-level interventions and unproductive institutionalization. In
contrast . . .justice conceived in an interdisciplinary program of study is rehabilitation
oriented [and] . . .aimed at therapeutic justice.").
21 Ronald Bailey, Bad Brains: How the Supreme Court's Teen Execution Decision
Proves Too Much, REASON MAG., Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.reason.com/news/show/34963.
html.
22 In the nineteenth century, Cesare Lombroso, an Italian physician and anthropolo-
gist, posited that the human body itself could provide evidence of criminal disposition.
See DAVID G. HORN, THE CRIMINAL BODY: LOMBROSO AND THE ANATOMY OF DEVI-
ANCE 1-27 (2003) (describing Lombroso's theories). Some of the more unfortunate appli-
cations for the use of such biological metrics of criminality are detailed in STEPHEN JAY
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 152-73 (rev. & expanded ed. 1996).
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humanitarian impulses (and the concerns about the present system of
capital punishment) that undergird the cognitive neuroscience project.
Judged by this standard, Part III concludes that, if realized, the
cognitive neuroscience project's aspirations for capital sentencing
reform would not succeed; to the contrary, the project would likely
aggravate the draconian and brutal features of the present capital sen-
tencing regime. This is because the short- and long-term goals of the
cognitive neuroscience project are at war with one another. The
short-term goal relies on a particular theory of capital mitigation that
is entirely dependent upon the retributive principle that the long-term
goal finds unintelligible, while the project's long-term aspiration envi-
sions a capital process that is single-mindedly concerned with the pre-
diction and prevention of criminal harms.
However, the extant mechanisms of capital sentencing that are
oriented towards these goals-most clearly embodied by the aggra-
vating factor of future dangerousness-are no friend to the capital
defendant. Often, a mitigation claim that death is not deserved is the
last refuge available to capital defendants confronted with evidence of
their future dangerousness. Thus the project's long-term aspiration,
by taking such backward-looking arguments off the table, unintention-
ally transforms the neuroimaging research from evidence supporting
mercy to evidence supporting permanent incapacitation. That is, by
attacking the legitimacy of the backward-looking lens of just deserts,
neuroimaging evidence ends up suggesting that the often intractable-
but nonexcusing for purposes of guilt23-biological predisposition to
violence should counsel in favor of the ultimate punishment. To sup-
port this conclusion, this Article examines the jurisprudence of future
dangerousness, exposes the (perhaps counterintuitive) salutary lim-
iting effects of retribution as a distributive principle in the capital con-
text, and briefly reprises the famous debate between H.L.A. Hart and
Lady Barbara Wootton on the purposes and nature of criminal law.
Before moving forward, it is necessary to note several caveats
about the scope of this Article, as well as the questions that it leaves
unaddressed. First, the aim of this Article is to seriously consider the
cognitive neuroscience project for capital sentencing on its own terms.
Thus, the critique and analysis will assume for the sake of argument
that cognitive neuroscience will ultimately acquire the technical
23 The special role of the jury in capital sentencing creates a unique situation in which
mental health evidence that is inadmissible during the "guilt" phase of a trial may still
come before a jury at the sentencing phase. For further discussion of the evidentiary issues
associated with the use of mental health evidence, including competency and diminished
capacity, in criminal litigation and capital sentencing determinations, see infra Part I.C and
notes 135-37.
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capacities necessary to realize the project's aspirations; the Article will
not address pragmatic objections arising from the technical and inter-
pretive complexities associated with neuroimaging.2 4 Nor will it
address evidentiary objections to the use, writ large, of neuroimaging
in court.25 As the discussion below shows, such evidence, for better or
worse, has already been admitted in numerous contexts in numerous
courts,26 especially for capital sentencing determinations. 27
The principal goal of this Article is to identify and explain the
unintended consequences that the cognitive neuroscience project
would have on capital sentencing. The Article leaves for another day
the vexed matter of how to proceed in light of this analysis. Rather, it
essays to lay an analytical groundwork for a future discussion of
whether and how the cognitive neuroscience project might be revised
in order to achieve its humanitarian goals.
24 For one such argument, see Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Crim-
inal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 400-01 (2006). For a
description of the strengths and weaknesses of common neuroimaging techniques, see infra
Part I.B.
25 Some commentators urge caution in this regard. See, e.g., Alverson & Smagac, supra
note 11, at 142 ("qEEG brain mapping should not be admissible under either the Frye or
the Daubert standards for admissibility of reliable scientific evidence."); Joseph Dumit,
Objective Brains, Prejudicial Images, 12 Sci. CONTEXT 173, 190-98 (1999) (arguing that
showing brain images to jurors is prejudicial, as such images are manipulable, dynamic, and
likely to be misinterpreted by non-expert jurors); Helen S. Mayberg, Functional Brain
Scans as Evidence in Criminal Court: An Argument for Caution, 33 J. NUCLEAR MED.
18N, 18N (1992) ("[F]unctional imaging methods have not reached the level of sophistica-
tion required to predict any neurological or psychiatric deficit .... "); Bridget Pratt, Soft
Science in the Courtroom? The Effects of Admitting Neuroimaging into Legal Proceedings,
1 PENN BioETHics J. 1, 3 (2005) (arguing that neuroimaging evidence tends to mislead
juries and, rather than being presented to juries directly, should be verbally described by
expert witnesses); Editorial, Forensic Neuroscience on Trial, 4 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1, 1
(2001) (suggesting "extensive field testing" to determine whether EEG scans can measure
presence or absence of "incriminating memories" in suspect's mind); Jennifer Kulynych,
Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1264-70 (1997) (suggesting that neuroimaging evidence should be admissible under
some circumstances, but advocating two-prong approach wherein courts analyze "tech-
nical" components of neuroimage-i.e., whether method for generating neuroimage meets
Daubert standard-separately from "inferential" component of such evidence-i.e., evalu-
ation of "inferential leap from the neuroimage to behavioral or psychological judgments").
26 See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
27 See infra Part II.A.
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THE ERA OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
A. Cognitive Neuroscience: Its Object and Premises
1. What is Cognitive Neuroscience?
Cognitive neuroscience is an investigational field that seeks to
understand how human sensory systems, motor systems, attention,
memory, language, higher cognitive functions, emotions, and even
consciousness arise from the structure and function of the brain.28
According to Francis Crick, "the overwhelming question in neurobi-
ology" is "the relation between the mind and the brain. ' 29 Cognitive
neuroscience has been described as a "bridging discipline"-between
biology and neuroscience, on the one hand, and cognitive science and
psychology, on the other.30
Interest and activity in the field exploded in the early 1990s, when
advances in imaging technology made studying the brain far easier
and less invasive than before. 3' Prior to such advances, many scien-
tists had focused their inquiries on animal and computational models
rather than on live human subjects.32 The advent of neuroimaging has
led to an enormous proliferation of scholarship; over the past five
years, an average of one thousand peer-reviewed, neuroimaging-based
scholarly articles have been published each month.33
The focus of cognitive neuroscience has expanded from an
inquiry into basic sensorimotor and cognitive processes to the explora-
tion of more highly complex behaviors. Over the past decade, with
the aid of neuroimaging, scientists have increasingly turned their
attention to the neurobiological correlates of behavior and to the links
between their science and vexed matters of public policy. 34 Their
28 HOWARD S. KIRSHNER, BEHAVIORAL NEUROLOGY: PRACTICAL SCIENCE OF MIND
AND BRAIN 5 (2002). See generally THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES III (Michael S.
Gazzaniga ed., 2004) (devoting chapters to "sensory systems," "motor systems," "atten-
tion," "memory," "language," "higher cognitive functions," and "emotion").
29 Francis Crick & Christof Koch, The Problem of Consciousness, ScI. AM., Sept. 1992,
at 153, 153.
30 JAMIE WARD, THE STUDENT'S GUIDE TO COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 3 (2006).
31 Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13; see also ORRIN DEVINSKY & MARK D'EsPosITO,
NEUROLOGY OF COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 52 (2004) (noting that
neuroimaging is "noninvasive" and can be used on living patients).
32 KIRSHNER, supra note 28, at 5.
33 David J. Heeger, N.Y. Univ., Mind Reading: Neuroscience Methods and Tech-
nology, Presentation at the Judicial Seminar on Emerging Issues in Neuroscience 3 (June
29, 2006), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/d-research/stl/June06/Heeger.pdf.
34 Judy Illes et al., Letter to the Editor, From Neuroimaging to Neuroethics, 6 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 205, 205 (2003) (surveying peer-reviewed articles involving fMRI from
1991 to 2001 and finding "a steady expansion of studies with evident social and policy
implications"). Martha J. Farah and Paul Root Wolpe provide a useful taxonomy for the
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efforts are motivated largely by the view, shared by many in the field,
that "[a]s we understand more about the details of the regulatory sys-
tems in the brain and how decisions emerge in neural networks, it is
increasingly evident that moral standards, practices, and policies
reside in our neurobiology. '35
Cognitive neuroscientists have thus brought their tools to bear on
contested moral and ethical (and, by extension, legal and political)
questions, including the moral status of the human embryo,36 the
brain function of patients diagnosed as minimally conscious or persist-
ently vegetative, 37 and the definition of "brain death. '38 Furthermore,
a number of peer-reviewed articles have addressed the cognitive
neuroscience of personality traits such as introversion, 39 extroversion
recent neuroscience research efforts that touch on moral, social, and public policy ques-
tions. They categorize such research under the following headings: "Imaging of Personal
Information," "Imaging of Personality," "Imaging of Social and Moral Attitudes,"
"Imaging of Preferences," "Forensic Imaging," and "Imaging Specific Thoughts." Martha
J. Farah & Paul Root Wolpe, Monitoring and Manipulating Brain Function: New Neuros-
cience Technologies and Their Ethical Implications, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June
2004, at 35, 37-39.
35 Patricia Smith Churchland, Moral Decision-making and the Brain, in NEUROETHICS:
DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY 3, 3 (Judy Illes ed., 2006).
36 See GAZZANIGA, supra note 14, at 7-18 (suggesting that fetus should not be consid-
ered "one of us" or granted "moral and legal rights of a human being" until it reaches
twenty-three weeks, which is when "life is sustainable" outside the womb and fetus could
"develop into a thinking human being with a normal brain"). But see Editorial, Morals and
the Mind: Michael Gazzaniga's Ethical Brain, 11 NEW ATLANTIS 121, 124 (2006) (criti-
quing Gazzaniga's argument on grounds that embryo before twenty-three weeks is "a self-
generating organism, an individual life in-process, already the particular person it is des-
tined to become" and that "[als important as the brain is to human identity, our mental life
is inseparable from our bodily life in subtle but profound ways"). For a comprehensive
discussion of the moral, legal, and public policy dimensions of the related debate over stem
cell research, see generally THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, MONITORING STEM
CELL RESEARCH (2004). Gazzaniga is a member of the President's Council on Bioethics,
which is charged with advising the White House on the ethical aspects of advancements in
biomedical science and biotechnology. This author served as General Counsel to the
Council from 2002 to 2005.
37 E.g., N.D. Schiff et al., fMRI Reveals Large-Scale Network Activation in Minimally
Conscious Patients, 64 NEUROLOGY 514, 522 (2005) (using fMRI to compare brain function
of patients in minimally conscious state (MCS) with patients in persistent vegetative state
(PVS)). For an overview and discussion of the legal and policy dimensions of one particu-
larly controversial case involving such a patient, see 0. Carter Snead, The (Surprising)
Truth About Schiavo: A Defeat for the Cause of Autonomy, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 101
(2005).
38 See, e.g., Laurence R. Tancredi, Neuroscience Developments and the Law, in
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 71, 72-76 (discussing neuroimaging
research on brain death and future legal and policy avenues that might develop from such
research).
39 E.g., Debra L. Johnson et al., Cerebral Blood Flow and Personality: A Positron
Emission Tomography Study, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 252, 254-56 (1999) (finding associa-
tion between introversion and increased blood flow to frontal lobe).
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and neuroticism,40 pessimism, 41 empathy,4 2 disposition towards coop-
eration and/or competition,43 novelty seeking, harm avoidance, and
reward dependence.4 4
Scientists are also investigating the neural mechanisms of emo-
tion, including aversion to unpleasant scenes and social cues (e.g.,
facial expressions). 45  There is a growing body of neuroimaging
research on social attitudes and preferences, including racial atti-
tudes46 (as well as the cerebral processes involved in making judg-
ments about "similar and dissimilar others"), 47 sexual attraction (as
well as the neural mechanisms employed in suppressing such attrac-
tion),48 and political predilections.4 9 Neuroscientists have also
40 E.g., Turhan Canli et al., Amygdala Response to Happy Faces as a Function of Extra-
version, 296 SCIENCE 2191, 2191 (2002) (examining correlation between amygdala activity
and extraversion and/or neuroticism of test subjects); Turhan Canli et al., An fMRI Study
of Personality Influences on Brain Reactivity to Emotional Stimuli, BEHAV. NEURO-
SCIENCE, Feb. 2001, at 33, 38 (same).
41 E.g., HAkan Fischer et al., Dispositional Pessimism and Amygdala Activity: A PET
Study in Healthy Volunteers, 12 NEURoREPORT 1635, 1637 (2001) (utilizing PET scans to
examine increased amygdala activity in pessimistic subjects).
42 E.g., Tania Singer et al., Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective But Not Sensory
Components of Pain, 303 SCIENCE 1157, 1158-61 (2004) (assessing brain activity associated
with empathy through use of fMRI).
43 See Illes et al., supra note 34, at 205 (surveying fMRI studies and noting increase in
studies touching on topics such as cooperation and competition).
44 See, e.g., Farah & Wolpe, supra note 34, at 37, 44 n.14 (collecting citations of studies
examining these issues).
45 E.g., K. Luan Phan et al., Functional Neuroanatomy of Emotion: A Meta-Analysis of
Emotional Activation Studies in PET and fMRI, 16 NEUROIMAGE 331 (2002) (performing
meta-analysis of studies of specific brain regions associated with emotional activitation);
Paul J. Whalen et al., Masked Presentations of Emotional Facial Expressions Modulate
Amygdala Activity Without Explicit Knowledge, 18 J. NEUROSCIENCE 411 (1998)
(presenting subjects with subliminal cues and scenes).
46 See, e.g., Allen J. Hart et al., Differential Response in the Human Amygdala to Racial
Outgroup vs. Ingroup Face Stimuli, 11 NEUROREPORT 2351 (2000) (examining whether
brain responds differently when individuals see faces of people of their own race rather
than of different race); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of
Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activity, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2000)
(finding that Caucasian subjects respond differently to Caucasian and African American
male faces with neutral facial expressions when those faces are unfamiliar but not when
faces are familiar and positively regarded); Elizabeth A. Phelps & Laura A. Thomas, Race,
Behavior, and the Brain: The Role of Neuroimaging in Understanding Complex Social
Behaviors, 24 POL. PSYCHOL. 747, 747 (2003) (surveying "neural systems involved in
processing race group information").
47 See, e.g., Jason P. Mitchell et al., Dissociable Medial Prefrontal Contributions to Judg-
ments of Similar and Dissimilar Others, 50 NEURON 655, 656 (2006) (suggesting that dif-
ferent parts of brain are involved when making inferences about those similar rather than
dissimilar to oneself).
48 See, e.g., Mario Beauregard et al., Neural Correlates of Conscious Self-Regulation of
Emotion, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE (RC165) 1, 1 (2001), http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/reprint/
21/18/RC165 (measuring brain activation "in normal male subjects while they either
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explored the neurological dimensions of moral decisionmaking 50 and
religious experiences. 51
Thus, it is hardly surprising that recent neuroimaging studies have
touched on matters, including the detection of deception 52 and the
roots of both impulsive and premeditated criminal violence,5 3 that
could have forensic applications in various criminal justice contexts.
Several of these recent developments approach what might be thought
of as "mind reading." Using neuroimaging techniques developed to
study high-level vision, scientists have been able to reliably discern the
type of image being viewed or imagined by a research subject, based
solely on the pattern of activity in the brain.54 Most recently, a
responded in a normal manner to erotic film excerpts or voluntarily attempted to inhibit
the sexual arousal induced by viewing erotic stimuli").
49 See, e.g., Matthew D. Lieberman et al., Is Political Cognition Like Riding a Bicycle?
How Cognitive Neuroscience Can Inform Research on Political Thinking, 24 POL.
PSYCHoL. 681, 683 (2003) (discussing how cognitive neuroscience may help explain polit-
ical attitudes); James P. Morris et al., Activation of Political Attitudes: A Psychophysio-
logical Examination of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis, 24 POL. PSYCHOL. 727, 733, 742
(2003) (testing hypothesis that evaluations of political concepts are stored in brain and
automatically activated when those concepts are encountered again).
50 See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement
in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2106 (2001) (theorizing that "[slome moral
dilemmas ... engage emotional processing to a greater extent than others," which then
affects moral judgments); Jonathan D. Cohen, Professor of Psychology & Dir., Ctr. for the
Study of Brain, Mind, & Behavior, Princeton Univ., Neuroscience and Neuroethics:
Reward and Decision, Presentation to the President's Council on Bioethics (Jan. 15, 2004),
available at http://bioethics.gov/transcripts/jan04/session4.html (discussing theory that
brain's processing of emotion explains variations in reactions to moral dilemmas).
51 See Peggy Curran, Soul Search, GAZETE (Montreal), Oct. 19, 2004, at A14 (dis-
cussing Mario Beauregard's research on neurological correlates of unio mystica (union
with God) experienced by group of cloistered Carmelite nuns in Montreal); Richard
Monastersky, Religion on the Brain, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), May 26, 2006,
at A15 (discussing Andrew Newberg's work utilizing SPECT scans to measure brain
activity of meditating and praying subjects).
52 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER Testing to
Detect Concealed Knowledge Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 135, 135, 143
(2001) (linking evidence of crime to information stored in perpetrator's brain to demon-
strate his knowledge of event); D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated
Deception: An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727
(2002) (using fMRI to compare brain activity when subjects lied with brain activity when
subjects were truthful).
53 For an extensive listing and discussion of current scholarly work on this subject, see
infra Part I.D. In addition, there is at least one commercial consulting venture that offers
the services of a "forensic neuroscience consultant" as an expert witness or litigation
advisor in both civil and criminal matters. Forensic Neuroscience Consultants, Inc., http://
www.forensicneuroscience.com (last visited July 28, 2007).
54 See James V. Haxby et al., Distributed and Overlapping Representations of Faces and
Objects in Ventral Temporal Cortex, 293 SCIENCE 2425, 2426-27 (2001) (reporting ability to
discern through analysis of brain-scan patterns which of several categories of images sub-
ject was viewing); Kathleen M. O'Craven & Nancy Kanwisher, Mental Imagery of Faces
and Places Activates Corresponding Stimulus-Specific Brain Regions, 12 J. COGNITIVE
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neuroimaging study was published that purported to identify the
"covert goals" that a subject intended to perform (specifically, either
the addition or subtraction of two given numbers). 55
The potential social implications of the foregoing sampling of
studies are striking. In the words of Judy Illes, director of Stanford
University's Program in Neuroethics, this research may ultimately
yield the possibility of using neuroimaging when "assess[ing] the
truthfulness of statements and memory in law, profiling prospective
employees for professional and interpersonal skills, evaluating stu-
dents for learning potential[,] ... selecting investment managers[,]...
and even choosing lifetime partners based on compatible brain
profiles for personality, interests, and desires. '56
2. Cognitive Neuroscience: The Grounding Premise
The foundational premise of cognitive neuroscience is that all
aspects of the mind are ultimately reducible to the structure and func-
tion of the brain. As Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen have
described it, cognitive neuroscience is the "understanding of the mind
as brain."'57 Thus, cognitive neuroscience seeks to provide "compre-
hensive explanations of human behavior in purely material terms. ' 58
For purposes of this Article, this approach will be referred to as
"reductive materialism." The premise can rightly be termed "reduc-
tive" in that it seeks to explain the "macrophenomena" of thought and
action solely in terms of the "microphenomena" of the physical
brain.59 It is "materialist" in that it postulates that human thought and
NEUROSCIENCE 1013, 1014 (2000) (contrasting brain activity in response to different classes
of visual stimuli).
55 John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 CUR-
RENT BIOLOGY 323, 323 (2007).
56 Judy Illes & Eric Racine, Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed
by Genetics, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar./Apr. 2005, at 5, 6.
57 Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1775 (2004)
(emphasis added). Neuroscientist David Heeger elaborates: "It's all in the brain-every-
thing about human behavior, human nature, and human society is controlled by the human
brain .... If this conjecture is correct, it will be possible with neuroscience methods like
fMRI to measure any and all aspects of an individual's mental state (conscious and uncon-
scious)." Heeger, supra note 33, at 6; see also Antonio R. Damasio, How the Brain Creates
the Mind, Sci. AM., Dec. 1999, at 112, 117 ("[B]y 2050 sufficient knowledge of biological
phenomena will have wiped out the traditional dualistic separations of body/brain, body/
mind and brain/mind.").
58 Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics: The Practical and the Philosophical, 9 TRENDS COGNI-
TIVE Sci. 34, 34 (2005).
59 See, e.g., PATRICIA SMITH CHURCHLAND, BRAIN-WISE: STUDIES IN
NEUROPHILOSOPHY 20-21 (2002) ("[A] reduction has been achieved when the causal
powers of the macrophenomenon are explained as a function of the physical structure and
causal powers of the microphenomenon.").
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behavior are caused solely by physical processes taking place inside
the brain-a three-pound bodily organ of staggering complexity, but a
bodily organ nonetheless. 60 In this way, cognitive neuroscience fol-
lows the dominant approach of modern science, which seeks to under-
stand and explain all observable phenomena as functions of their
component parts. Under this methodology, questions of biology are
thought to be reducible to matters of chemistry, which are, by exten-
sion, reducible to problems of physics. 61 In principle, this approach
will ultimately lead to the analysis of all phenomena in terms of the
relationships of motion and rest among their most elemental
particles. 62
In defense of reductive materialism in the neuroscience context,
proponents cite evidence that "changes in our brain are both neces-
sary and sufficient for changes in our mind. ' 63 The most well-known
example of this principle is the nineteenth-century case of Phineas
Gage, a law-abiding railway worker who was radically changed into a
callous, unreliable troublemaker following an accident in which an
iron tamping rod was driven through his orbitofrontal cortex, the
frontal brain region just above and behind the eyes.64 As Steven
Pinker, a Harvard experimental psychologist, put it:
60 "Materialism" denotes the philosophical premise'that only physical things truly exist
and, thus, that all phenomena must be explained exclusively in terms of material causes.
See, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE DICIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 599-602 (Robert Audi ed., 1995)
(defining and discussing materialism as philosophical concept). An alternative descriptor
of the cognitive neuroscience premise is "biological mechanism," which "broadly attempts
to reduce all vital operations to the laws of physics and chemistry." WILLIAM A.
WALLACE, THE ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHY: A COMPENDIUM FOR PHILOSOPHERS AND
THEOLOGIANS 213-14 (1977). A related philosophical concept, "eliminative materialism,"
is a doctrine that invokes the findings of cognitive neuroscience to support the assertion
that "our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically
false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology
of that theory will eventually be displaced ...by completed neuroscience." Paul M.
Churchland, Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes, 78 J. PHIL. 67, 67 (1981).
For a very fine student comment exploring the implications of this approach for criminal
law, see Andrew E. Lelling, Comment, Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience and the
Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471 (1993).
61 See, e.g., ERWIN SCHRODINGER, WHAT IS LIFE? THE PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF THE
LIVING CELL & MIND AND MATTER 86-91 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1969) (1944) (theo-
rizing that living organisms can be most richly understood and explained in terms of
physics and chemistry).
62 See, e.g., FRANCIS CRICK, OF MOLECULES AND MEN 10-14 (1966) ("The ultimate
aim of the modern movement in biology is in fact to explain all biology in terms of physics
and chemistry.").
63 Michael S. Gazzaniga & Megan S. Steven, Free Will in the Twenty-first Century: A
Discussion of Neuroscience and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at
51, 52.
64 See Raymond J. Dolan, On the Neurology of Morals, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 927,
927-28 (1999) (citing J.M. Harlow, Passage of an Iron Rod Through the Head, 39 BOSTON
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Another problem [with arguments against materialism] is the over-
whelming evidence that the mind is the activity of the brain. The
supposedly immaterial soul, we now know, can be bisected with a
knife, altered by chemicals, started or stopped by electricity, and
extinguished by a sharp blow or by insufficient oxygen. Under a
microscope, the brain has a breathtaking complexity of physical
structure fully commensurate with the richness of the mind.6 5
Reductive materialism is a widely accepted approach among
neuroscientists. Michael Gazzaniga recently stated that, in his estima-
tion, "98 or 99 percent" of cognitive neuroscientists share a commit-
ment to reductive materialism in seeking to explain mental
phenomena. 66 This near-universal commitment to using material cau-
sation to explain the mind and human behavior carries with it
profound implications for perennial concepts such as the existence of
the soul, free will, selfhood, and consciousness. As Francis Crick has
famously written, "your joys and your sorrows, your memories and
your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in
fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and
their associated molecules. '67
MED. & SURGICAL J. 389 (1848)) (discussing Harlow's treatment of Gage as well as more
recent work of Antonio Damasio on how orbifrontal cortex affects personality). The
remarkable thing about Gage's injury is that he suffered such an extreme alteration in
personality without similarly losing his cognitive capacities.
Gage's accident is not the only early example of individual misfortune bearing salutary
fruits for the development of science. The development of the high-powered rifle and its
use in World War I led indirectly to advances in neuroscience, as those soldiers suffering
from nonlethal, penetrating head injuries offered doctors unique and theretofore unparal-
leled opportunities to study the impact that highly localized insults to the brain have on
cognition and personality. See, e.g., WALTHER POPPELREUTER, DISTURBANCES OF LOWER
AND HIGHER VISUAL CAPACITIES CAUSED BY OCCIPITAL DAMAGE (Josef Zihi trans.,
Clarendon Press 1990) (1917) (analyzing data on more than 700 cases of such head injuries
sustained during World War I and their effects on brain functions such as vision).
65 STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 64 (1997).
66 Monastersky, supra note 51 (quoting Gazzaniga).
67 FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR THE
SOUL 3 (1994); see also Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1784 (concluding that free will
as we understand it is generated by our "cognitive architecture"). Philosopher Patricia
Churchland elaborates:
Bit by experimental bit, neuroscience is morphing our conception of what we
are. The weight of evidence now implies that it is the brain, rather than some
nonphysical stuff, that feels, thinks, and decides .... [I]t also appears highly
doubtful that there is a special nonphysical module, the will, operating in a
causal vacuum to create voluntary choices .... The mind that we are assured
can dominate over matter is in fact certain brain patterns interacting with and
interpreted by other brain patterns. Moreover, one's self, as apprehended
introspectively and represented incessantly, is a brain-dependent construct,
susceptible to change as the brain changes, and is gone when the brain is gone
CHURCHLAND, supra note 59, at 1-2.
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To be sure, cognitive neuroscientists (and the philosophers who
invoke their research) do not universally agree that materialist
accounts of human behavior should wholly alter or displace traditional
concepts. One could fill many volumes in an effort to give a respon-
sible account of the debates as they have unfolded. On the issue of
free will, which is perhaps the most significant for this Article's pur-
poses, some have adopted a posture of "Hard Determinism" (con-
cluding that the reduction of all mental processes to physical events
renders the notion of uncaused choice unintelligible), 68 while others
(sometimes called "Compatibilists") adhere to the view that reductive
materialism still leaves a limited amount of room for free choice.69 In
turn, this has profound implications for traditional notions of personal
responsibility. Apart from these disagreements, those in the field are
of the shared opinion that the findings of cognitive neuroscience
compel a deep reevaluation of the philosophical concepts lying at the
root of our most weighty moral, ethical, and political decisions. 70 As
will be evident in forthcoming sections, the necessity of reevaluating
free will looms large over the aspirations of the cognitive neuroscience
project for capital sentencing.
B. Neuroimaging: A Window into the Mind?
Before proceeding with a discussion and critique of the goals of
cognitive neuroscience for capital punishment, it is worth pausing
68 See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1776 (arguing that "free will, as concep-
tualized by the folk psychology system, is an illusion").
69 See, e.g., Gazzaniga & Steven, supra note 63, at 57 (citing work of Benjamin Libet,
Conscious vs Neural Time, 352 NATURE 27 (1991), identifying span of only milliseconds in
which conscious self can veto particular actions). For a useful discussion of the various
positions taken in the debate over free will, see Walter Glannon, Neurobiology,
Neuroimaging, and Free Will, 29 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 68 (2005). See also Stephen J.
Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 6,
at 169-71 (arguing that new neuroscience studies do not disprove that individuals are con-
scious, intentional agents).
70 For example, as Judy Illes and Eric Racine put it:
[T]he relationship between the brain and the self is far more direct than the
link between genes and personal identity. The locus for integrating behavior
resides in the brain, even if discrete features are determined by our genes.
Whether neurotechnology measures that behavior through imaging, or
manipulates it through implants of neural tissue or devices, it will fundamen-
tally alter the dynamic between personal identity, responsibility, and free will
in ways that genetics never has. Indeed, neurotechnologies as a whole are
challenging our sense of personhood and providing new tools to society for
judging it.
Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 14 (citations omitted); see also Farah & Wolpe, supra note
34, at 36 ("The brain is the organ of the mind and consciousness, the locus of our sense of
selfhood.... Our moral and legal conceptions of responsibility are likewise susceptible to
change as our understanding of the physical mechanisms of behavior evolves.").
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briefly to describe the technology of neuroimaging itself. It is beyond
the scope of this Article to give an exhaustive exegesis of the technical
workings of structural and functional neuroimaging. Sufficient for
present purposes is an overview of the technology, principles, virtues,
and limitations of present-day neuroimaging.
"Neuroimaging" generally refers to the use of various technolo-
gies to observe-directly or indirectly-the structure and function of
the brain. "Structural" or "anatomical" neuroimaging is limited to the
observation of the brain's architecture. "Functional" neuroimaging
permits the construction of computerized images that measure the
brain's activity with varying degrees of temporal and anatomical reso-
lution, depending on the technology employed. 71 More recent tech-
niques for functional neuroimaging also allow for the simultaneous
imaging of the brain's structure.72
1. Anatomical Techniques
The two principal techniques for structural neuroimaging are
computed tomography (CT) scanning and magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI). 73 CT scanning, introduced in 1972, M uses x-rays and
a computerized algorithm to reconstruct an image of the brain.75 CT
scanning has been largely supplanted by MRI, which has superior spa-
tial resolution. 76 MRI constructs a computerized image of the brain
by measuring the signal strengths of the various radio frequencies
emitted by the proton nuclei of atoms in brain tissue when the protons
are placed in a strong magnetic field.77
71 DEVINSKY & D'EsPosITo, supra note 31, at 52-53.
72 See id. at 53 (identifying studies linking cognitive processes to specific brain areas).
73 See Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 1 (explaining CT and MRI techniques).
74 Computed tomography was introduced by the British scientist Godfrey Hounsfield,
who later shared a 1979 Nobel Prize with American Allan Cormack for its development.
The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1979, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/
medicine/laureates/1979 (last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
75 Keith A. Johnson, Neuroimaging Primer, in THE WHOLE BRAIN ATLAS (Keith A.
Johnson & J. Alex Becker eds.), http://www.med.harvard.edu/AANLIB/hmsl.html (last
visited July 28, 2007).
76 See Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 1 (noting that MRI-which has largely replaced
CT scanning-provides excellent detailed structural information and enables naked eye to
distinguish gray matter (neuronal cell bodies) from white matter (myelinated tracts)).
77 As Keith Johnson describes it:
When protons (here brain protons) are placed in a magnetic field, they
become capable of receiving and then transmitting electromagnetic energy.
The strength of the transmitted energy is proportional to the number of pro-
tons in the tissue. Signal strength is modified by properties of each proton's
microenvironment, such as its mobility and the local homogeneity of the mag-
netic field. MR signal can be "weighted" to accentuate some properties and
not others.
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2. Functional Techniques
The first technique allowing the observation of the brain's elec-
trical function was electroencephalography (EEG), introduced by
Hans Berger in 1929.78 EEG uses electrodes placed on the scalp to
directly measure "event related potential"-the total electrical
response of a large number of neurons inside the brain.79 EEG pro-
vides excellent temporal resolution, recording brain activity within
milliseconds of its occurrence.80  A related technique,
magnetoencephalography (MEG), directly measures the magnetic
fields produced by these same electrical charges from neural activity.81
Like EEG, MEG also provides excellent temporal resolution. 2 How-
ever, both EEG and MEG have poor spatial resolution, as neither
technique can precisely localize the source of the electrical signal
measured.83
The more recently developed techniques of functional
neuroimaging include positron emission tomography (PET), single-
photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 84 It has long been thought that
there is a relationship between neuronal activity and regional cerebral
When an additional magnetic field is superimposed, one which is carefully
varied in strength at different points in space, each point in space has a unique
radio frequency at which the signal is received and transmitted. This makes
constructing an image possible. It represents the spatial encoding of fre-
quency, just like a piano.
Johnson, supra note 75. In 2003, Paul Lauterbur and Peter Mansfield received a Nobel
Prize for their discoveries concerning MRI. The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine
2003, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/medicine/laureates/2003/press.html (last visited
June 16, 2007). However, a patent relating to MRI was granted in 1974 to Raymond
Damadian. Apparatus & Method for Detecting Cancer in Tissue, U.S. Patent No.
3,789,832 (filed Mar. 17, 1972) (issued Feb. 5, 1974).
78 Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 6.
79 See DEVINSKY & D'EsposrTo, supra note 31, at 53 (tracing development of EEG
and other brain imaging techniques); Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 6 (describing EEG
as first tool to "unveil fundamental knowledge" about human brain); Bunge & Kahn,
supra note 13, § 4 (explaining technique and usefulness of EEG); Heeger, supra note 33, at
2 (describing EEG as "brain fingerprinting").
80 DEVINSKY & D'EsPosITO, supra note 31, at 53; Heeger, supra note 33, at 44.
81 DEVINSKY & D'EsPOSITO, supra note 31, at 53; Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 4.
82 Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 6.
83 Id. § 4.
84 This is not an exhaustive list of the methods of functional neuroimaging, though
these do represent the dominant approaches. For a discussion of additional approaches,
including optical brain imaging and near-infrared spectroscopy, see Bunge & Kahn, supra
note 13, § 5.3. For an overview of proton magnetic resonance spectroscopy and an
example of its practical application to the treatment of affective disorders, see Gregory J.
Moore & Matthew P. Galloway, Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy: Neurochemistry and
Treatment Effects in Affective Disorders, 36 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 5, 14-18
(2002).
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blood flow-that is, blood flow to the region of the brain that is active
during a given task. 85 PET, SPECT, and fMRI all depend on this
principle: once a threshold level of neuronal activity is reached, PET,
SPECT, and fMRI indirectly measure highly localized brain activity
by recording certain proxies associated with cerebral blood flow.
86
For instance, PET and SPECT require the injection of small
amounts of radiolabeled molecules-radioactive tracer compounds-
into the bloodstream, which enter the brain after approximately thirty
seconds. 87  These molecules show either the uptake of
nonmetabolized congeners of glucose (which is equated with
increased cellular activity), the anatomical distribution of specific pro-
teins (e.g., transporters), or specific neuronal functions (such as the
displacement of a neurotransmitter from its receptor). 88 In PET, the
radiolabeled molecules (e.g., 2-deoxyglucose) are absorbed and con-
centrated in tissue just as if they were a natural compound (e.g., glu-
cose). 89 The tracer compounds begin to decay, thus emitting positrons
that can be detected and observed, allowing for the production of
85 See Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 5.1 ("[Charles Smart] Roy and [Sir Charles]
Sherrington first showed in 1890 that brain stimulation led to a local increase in blood flow
to active populations of neurons."); see also RICHARD B. BUXTON, INTRODUCTION TO
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 3 (2002)
("[W]e must suppose a very delicate adjustment whereby the circulation follows the needs
of the cerebral activity. Blood very likely may rush to each region of the cortex according
as it is most active, but of this we know nothing." (quoting William James's 1890
observation)).
86 See, e.g., DEVINSKY & D'EsPosITO, supra note 31, at 53 (noting that modern func-
tional brain imaging methods "measure changes in cerebral blood flow" and consequently
"provide an indirect but highly localized measure of increases in neural activity").
87 Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 5.1.
88 See David J. Brooks, Positron Emission Tomography and Single-Photon Emission
Computed Tomography in Central Nervous System Drug Development, 2 NEURORx J. AM.
Soc'y EXPERIMENTAL NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 226, 229-30 (2005) (describing molecules
showing cerebral glucose metabolism, loss of striatal dopamine function, and distribution
of amyloid peptides and microtubule-associated peptides in brain). As Brooks explains:
Positron emission tomography (PET) and single-photon emission computed
tomography (SPECT) provide a means of examining regional cerebral blood
flow, metabolism, and pharmacology in vivo under both resting and activating
conditions. These molecular imaging techniques rely on radiolabeled mole-
cules (tracers) that bind to enzyme sites or surface receptors. PET utilizes
short-lived positron emitting isotopes (1SO, '1 C, 18F, 76 Br), whereas SPECT uses
lower energy y-emitting isotopes (123I, 99Tc). Both techniques can detect
nanomoles of tracer, but PET has the advantage that it is more sensitive and
versatile and allows scatter correction to be performed. SPECT is, however,
cheaper and more widely available as it does not rely on a local cyclotron for
production of isotopes.
Id. at 226.
89 For an overview of the radioisotopes used in PET scans, see Mayfield Clinic, Posi-
tron Emission Tomography (PET) Scan, http://www.precisionradiotherapy.com/PE-PET.
htm (last visited July 28, 2007).
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images that map the distribution of the tracer compounds throughout
the brain.90 SPECT differs from PET in that it uses different tracer
compounds-ones that remain in the bloodstream instead of being
absorbed. Thus, SPECT images are limited to areas of blood flow. 91
Whether using PET or SPECT, researchers infer that the areas with
the highest observed metabolic activity are the regions of greatest
brain activation during the task under study.
The advantage of PET and SPECT over other approaches, such
as fMRI, is that researchers can customize the radiolabeled com-
pounds to study very specific metabolic or pharmacological activities
in the brain; this allows researchers to target their studies towards the
function of specific neurotransmitter systems.92 Despite this virtue,
PET and SPECT share several weaknesses. First, they both require
the injection of radioactive material into a human subject, which cre-
ates nontrivial risks, prevents multiple trials over a short period of
time, and precludes their use in certain human subjects, such as chil-
dren.93 Both also have poor temporal resolution, with a delay of up to
thirty minutes between the activity and the measurement. 94 More-
over, both PET and SPECT are very expensive techniques. 95 These
disadvantages have led researchers to turn elsewhere, and they have
settled on fMRI as their preferred functional neuroimaging technique.
fMRI has eclipsed all other techniques as the most widely used
form of functional neuroimaging. 96 Like PET and SPECT, it relies on
the principle that regional brain activation is indicated by increased
90 University of Washington, Division of Nuclear Medicine, Introduction to PET
Physics: The Physical Principles of PET, § 2.1, http://depts.washington.edu/nucmed/IRL/
petjintro/introsrc/section2.html (last visited July 28, 2007).
91 Mayfield Clinic, Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT), http://
www.mayfieldclinic.com/PE-SPECT.htm (last visited July 28, 2007).
92 Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 5.1.
93 See, e.g., DEVINSKY & D'EsPosITO, supra note 31, at 53 (noting that PET's use "was
limited by the need for radioactive tracers to measure cerebral blood flow"); Bunge &
Kahn, supra note 13, § 5.1 (explaining PET's disadvantages); Mayfield Clinic, supra note
89 (noting that pregnant or nursing women should not undergo PET scans); Mayfield
Clinic, supra note 91 (noting that pregnant or nursing women should not undergo SPECT
scans).
94 Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 8 (noting that PET's limitations include "lag time of
up to 30 minutes between stimulation and data acquisition"); Nora D. Volkow et al.,
Imaging the Living Human Brain: Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Positron Emission
Tomography, 94 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. 2787, 2787 tbl.1 (1997) (comparing tem-
poral resolution of PET, SPECT, and other imaging techniques); see also Bunge & Kahn,
supra note 13, § 5.1 (explaining poor temporal resolution of PET).
95 See Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 8 (noting that there are fewer than one hundred
PET scanners in United States today and that use of both PET and SPECT may be limited
due to cost).
96 DEVINSKY & D'EsPosITO, supra note 31, at 55; Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 5.2;
see also Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 7 ("It is the widespread availability of MR scan-
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cerebral blood flow. Whereas PET and SPECT utilize the proxies of
blood flow and metabolic activity (e.g., glucose metabolism) of brain
cells, fMRI measures the surplus of oxygenated blood recruited to the
active brain region under consideration. 97 When the brain activity in
a particular region increases, so too does the concentration of oxygen-
ated blood (the "hemodynamic response"), 98 while the concentration
of deoxygenated blood simultaneously decreases. Deoxygenated
blood contains deoxyhemoglobin, which is paramagnetic; that is, its
presence causes a decrease in the magnetic resonance signal.99 When
oxygenated blood flows to a brain region (and the concentration of
deoxyhemoglobin decreases), the magnetic resonance signal
increases-a phenomenon referred to as the blood oxygenated level-
dependent (BOLD) response. 100 Researchers interpret the increase
in cerebral blood flow to a particular brain region (indicated by an
increase in magnetic resonance signal strength) as an increase in cel-
lular activity in that particular region.' 0 '
fMRI has numerous advantages over PET and SPECT. 10 2 It is
noninvasive and seemingly harmless. 10 3 Its spatial resolution is excel-
lent.104 Its temporal resolution is superior to other indirect methods
ners today and the noninvasiveness of the imaging approach enabled by MR [that] have set
fMRI apart from other neuroimaging tools .... ").
97 Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 8; Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 5.2 ("It is this
surplus of oxygen that is detected with fMRI, with what is known as the blood oxygen-level
dependent (BOLD) contrast.").
98 Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 5.2; see also DEVINSKY & D'EsPOSITO, supra note
31, at 56 (explaining that neural event in brain region increases local blood flow and con-
centration of oxygenated blood, which "leads to an increase in the fMRI signal").
99 DEVINSKY & D'ESPOSITO, supra note 31, at 56.
100 See id. (providing more detailed explanation of physiological and electromagnetic
dimensions of clinical MRI methods). The term "fMRI" typically refers to the MRI tech-
nique that utilizes the BOLD response to measure increased oxygen demand by nerve
cells. Other MRI methods provide insight into physiological function (e.g., "arterial spin
labeling" and "intravenous bolus tracking," which are both categorized as types of "perfu-
sion MRI"), the anatomy of nerve fiber tracts ("diffusion-weighted imaging"), and levels of
certain neurochemicals ("MR spectroscopy"). For a description and discussion of these
approaches, see Jeffrey P. Lorberbaum et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) for the Psychiatrist, http://www.musc.edu/fnrd/primerjfmri.htm (last visited July
28, 2007).
101 DEVINSKY & D'EsPOSITO, supra note 31, at 56.
102 See Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 5.2 (listing advantages of fMRI as (1) wide
availability of MRI technology, (2) low per-scan costs, (3) lack of recognized risks, (4)
good spatial resolution, and (5) superior temporal resolution relative to other techniques).
103 See DEVINSKY & D'EsPOSITO, supra note 31, at 55 ("[I]n addition to not requiring
the injection of a radioisotope, fMRI is noninvasive .... ); Illes & Racine, supra note 56,
at 8 (including "[n]oninvasive[ness], study repeatability, [and] no known risks" among
fMRI strengths).
104 See DEVINSKY & D'EsPosITO, supra note 31, at 55 (indicating that fMRI has spatial
resolution in millimeters while PET's spatial resolution is in centimeters).
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of functional neuroimaging (e.g., PET and SPECT),10 5 though inferior
to EEG and MEG 10 6 (which have far inferior spatial resolution, as
noted above). It is widely thought that fMRI, among all neuroimaging
techniques, best balances temporal and spatial resolution.10 7
3. Potential Difficulties
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss at length the
potential technical and interpretive difficulties that accompany the
efforts to use neuroimaging to draw inferences about morally and
socially relevant behavior, and these difficulties have been explored
extensively elsewhere. 10 8 Rather, the present inquiry will assume for
105 Bunge & Kahn, supra note 13, § 5.1.
106 See DEVINSKY & D'EsPosITO, supra note 31, at 56 (noting that sluggishness of
hemodynamic response "limits the temporal resolution of the fMRI signal to a few seconds
as opposed to the millisecond temporal resolution of electrophysiological recordings of
neural activity" like EEG or MEG). It is noteworthy that while fMRI's temporal resolu-
tion is superior to PET's or SPECT's, the hemodynamic response measured by fMRI is
orders of magnitude slower than the underlying neural activity for which it is a proxy. Id.
107 Id. at 57; Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 7. For a discussion of the technical disad-
vantages of fMRI (including temporal resolution), as well as experimental design issues,
statistical errors, methodological limitations, and a further account of the types of hypoth-
eses that are best suited to fMRI, see DEVINSKY & D'EsPosiTo, supra note 31, at 57-65.
108 See, e.g., JOSEPH DUMIT, PICTURING PERSONHOOD: BRAIN SCANS AND BIOMEDICAL
IDENTITY 15-16 (2004) (discussing assumptions about "human nature," "how the brain
works," and how "person and brain are related" that are embedded in brain-imaging
studies); JOHN HORGAN, THE UNDISCOVERED MIND: How THE HUMAN BRAIN DEFIES
REPLICATION, MEDICATION, AND EXPLANATION 21-23 (1999) (arguing that neuroimaging
studies overemphasize role of brain's subdivisions as separate entities and fail to explore
relationships between brain's different parts); Anne Beaulieu, Images Are Not the (Only)
Truth: Brain Mapping, Visual Knowledge, and Iconoclasm, 27 ScI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES
53, 62 (2002) (noting view of some scientists that neuroimaging work is simply "making
pretty pictures" and "is at best observational and not the scientific study of function");
Joseph Dumit, Twenty-First-Century PET: Looking for Mind and Morality Through the
Eye of Technology, in TECHNOSCIENTIFIC IMAGINARIES: CONVERSATIONS, PROFILES, AND
MEMOIRS 87, 96-104 (George E. Marcus ed., 1995) (presenting interviews with several
"fathers" of PET scanning and addressing PET's interpretive difficulties and technical limi-
tations and misleading use of PET images); Joseph Dumit, When Explanations Rest: 'Good
Enough' Brain Science and the New Socio-Medical Disorders, in LIVING AND WORKING
WITH THE NEW MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 209, 209-11 (Margaret Lock et al. eds., 2000)
(undertaking an "ethnographic characterization" of "the new socio-medical disorders,"
including chronic fatigue and Gulf War syndromes and post-traumatic stress disorder, to
show "how scans and other biological evidence are usually not the final word on these
disorders"); Farah & Wolpe, supra note 34, at 40 (discussing "illusory accuracy" of brain
scans and describing interpretive difficulties); Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 12-15
(addressing interpretive difficulties due to technical limitations of neuroimaging studies
and various cultural and religious preconceptions); Kelly Joyce, Appealing Images: Mag-
netic Resonance Imaging and the Production of Authoritative Knowledge, 35 Soc. STUD.
Sci. 437, 448-53 (2005) (describing obstacles to proper interpretation of fMRI scans); S.M.
Kosslyn, If Neuroimaging Is the Answer, What Is the Question?, 354 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL Soc'Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1283, 1283 (1999) (noting that neuroimaging techniques
are not well-suited to "exploratory," open-ended inquiries and proposing instead specific
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the sake of argument that neuroimaging can yield significant insights
into the brain's anatomy and related functions that are relevant to
morality, law, and public policy. This Article seeks to analyze the cog-
nitive neuroscience project according to its own aspirations without
regard to practical, technical, and epistemic concerns. Nevertheless, it
is useful to acknowledge and review the most commonly raised objec-
tions to the project in the scholarly discourse to date.
One concern is that, given the profound obstacles to isolating,
controlling, and studying cognitive processes, it is quite difficult to
show a conclusive relationship of necessity between a particular brain
region's function and any associated cognitive process. 10 9 Relatedly,
there is the usual experimental difficulty of distinguishing causation
from mere correlation. 110 Concerns have also been raised about the
notion of functional specialization of brain regions, a premise that is
central to neuroimaging studies."' That is, certain brain regions may
serve multiple cognitive functions or, alternatively, multiple cognitive
questions that such techniques might actually resolve); Neuroethics Needed: Researchers
Should Speak Out on Claims Made on Behalf of Their Science, 441 NATURE 907, 907
(2006) (noting that some scientists disapprove of using fMRI scans as lie-detector tests
because "there is scant evidence that [fMRI scans] can reliably distinguish a lie from the
truth in any individual case"); Richard Robinson, fMRI Beyond the Clinic: Will It Ever Be
Ready for Primetime?, 2 PUB. LiBR. Sci. BIOLOGY 715, 716 (2004) (noting limitations of
current fMRI techniques and arguing that while fMRI may shed light on brain functioning
in general, it does not explain brain functioning in any particular individual); Sam Jaffe,
Fake Method for Research Impartiality (fMRI), SCIENTIST, July 19, 2004, at 64 (criticizing
fMRI's poor temporal resolution and noting that fMRI measures proxies for brain activity
rather than brain activity itself).
109 See, for example, DEVINSKY & D'EsposITO, supra note 31, at 53-54, who explain:
When a subject performs a task during imaging, it is difficult to demonstrate
conclusively that he or she is differentially engaging a single, identified cogni-
tive process. The subject may engage in unwanted cognitive processes that
either have no overt, measurable effects or are perfectly confounded with the
process of interest. Consequently, the neural activity measured by the func-
tional neuroimaging technique may result from some confounding neural com-
putation that is itself not necessary for executing the cognitive process under
study.
There are, however, some experimental techniques, such as transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (TMS), which temporarily isolate or disrupt the function of targeted brain regions,
allowing researchers to draw inferences about the sufficiency or necessity of the given
region to the particular cognitive activity under study. See, e.g., Dennis J.L.G. Schutter et
al., Introducing Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and Its Property of Causal Infer-
ence in Investigating Brain-Function Relationships, 141 SYNTHESE 155, 155 (2004) ("TMS
can serve as a heuristic method for resolving causal issues in an arena [i.e., neuronal func-
tion] where only correlative tools have traditionally been available.").
110 Similarly, there is the difficulty of identifying whether it is the brain that is gener-
ating the observed behavior or whether external experiences and behavior are shaping the
structure and function of the brain.
III See, e.g., Heeger, supra note 33, at 21-31 (noting importance of premise of func-
tional specialization).
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functions may activate the same region of the brain. 112 This increases
the risk of error in drawing inferences from neuroimaging data about
the brain, the mind, and behavior. This difficulty is compounded
because the most common forms of neuroimaging use indirect mea-
sures of brain activity. Depending on the technique, either blood flow
or metabolic activity (with PET and SPECT) or the concentration of
oxygenated blood (with fMRI) serve as proxies for studying regional
brain activity. 11 3 Thus, the measurements derived from these tech-
niques are necessarily attenuated from the ultimate object of
interest-namely, cognitive function. 114
These concerns, in turn, have led to concerns about the interpre-
tation of the data generated by neuroimaging. As Martha J. Farah
and Paul Root Wolpe have observed, "Although brainwaves do not
lie, neither do they tell the truth; they are simply measures of brain
activity." 115 Furthermore, the array of expertise required to produce a
single neuroimage (i.e., neuroscience, computational theory, physics,
computer science, statistical analysis, and nuclear medicine) presents
numerous opportunities for technical error.116 There is also a lack of
standardization among the machines and laboratory procedures used
112 See, e.g., DEVINSKY & D'EsPosITO, supra note 31, at 54-55 ("[A]ssuming that a
particular brain region is activated by a cognitive process (evoked by a particular task), the
neural activity in that brain region must depend on engaging that particular cognitive pro-
cess. . . . However, this region may also support other cognitive processes."). Stephen
Kosslyn notes that it is not yet understood whether brain activation (as measured by
neuroimaging) indicates excitation or inhibition of function since both excitatory and
inhibitory neurons produce a metabolic demand when active. Kosslyn, supra note 108, at
1292.
113 Additional concerns have been raised that the indirect proxies measured (i.e., neural
activity and hemodynamic response) take place on a time scale that is orders of magnitude
slower than the underlying neural events. See supra note 106.
114 A potent rejoinder might be that the brain is the locus of the mind and, therefore,
that the attenuation between the proxies measured by neuroimaging and the mental
activity itself is smaller than the attenuation between the mind and the measurement taken
by the instruments of traditional psychology (such as personality questionnaires) or other
forensic methods (such as conventional polygraphs). See Farah & Wolpe, supra note 34, at
40 ("Brain-based measures .... are one causal step closer to [psychological] traits and
states than responses on personality questionnaires or polygraph tracings.").
115 Id.
116 See Farah, supra note 58, at 35 ("[T]he public... [may] fail[ ] to appreciate the many
layers of signal processing and statistical analysis that intervene between actual brain func-
tion and resulting image or waveform, as well as the complex set of assumptions required
.... "); Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 13 ("[T]he brain image represents unparalleled
complexity-from the specialized medical equipment needed to acquire a scan, to the
array of parameters used to elicit activations and the statistical thresholds set to draw out
meaningful patterns, to the expertise required for the objective interpretation of the maps
themselves."); Reeves et al., supra note 16, at 90 (explaining that image generation
involves "many assumptions, corrections, and compromises and various levels of analysis,"
and that process is "easily manipulated by a person with knowledge of the technology").
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
1288 [Vol. 82:1265
November 2007] NEUROIMAGING AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
in the field. 1 7 The wide variability in brain physiology among experi-
mental subjects and the concomitant difficulties in defining normalcy
also make it difficult to draw meaningful comparisons.' " 8 Thus, while
it is among the most powerful new tools available, fMRI is rarely used
for diagnostic applications and has not yet become part of standard
practice for clinicians." 19
An additional concern is that the use of cognitive neuroimaging
data to diagnose psychological conditions relies entirely on the sound-
ness of the diagnostic criteria-which, given the absence of specific
biological markers for any psychiatric disorder, can be hotly con-
tested.120 Moreover, the "[i]nterpretation of neuroimaging studies [is]
not only bound by scientific frameworks, but also cultural and anthro-
pological ones." 121 Concepts which are integral to the interpretation
of cognitive neuroimaging, such as "personhood," "self," and "con-
sciousness," can vary widely from culture to culture. This only adds
further complexity to the analysis of data acquired in such studies. 22
Finally, there is a worry that people will ignore the foregoing technical
and interpretive complexities in a rush towards practical application,
especially given the current enthusiasm about the potential of
117 See Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 13 (noting an "absence of standards of practice
in the laboratory" that adds "another layer of complexity for drawing conclusions");
Reeves et al., supra note 16, at 90 (noting that neuroimaging "steps are not standardized
from one technology to the next or from one machine or laboratory to the next").
118 See DEVINSKY & D'EsPosITO, supra note 31, at 63 ("[Tjhe effect of a single condi-
tion .. cannot be compared directly between groups of subjects."); Illes & Racine, supra
note 56, at 13 (noting that functional imaging results may be "subject to physiologic and
day-to-day variations"); Reeves et al., supra note 16, at 90 ("The definition of normal may
be ambiguous in brain imaging.").
119 See, e.g., Farah & Wolpe, supra note 34, at 37 (explaining that fMRI is not yet reli-
able "at the individual patient level"). However, much has been written about the possi-
bility of using fMRI in clinical practice, particularly in "presurgical planning and
prognosis" of intractable epilepsy, arteriovenous malformations, and brain tumors, as well
as for Alzheimer's disease and other forms of dementia. See DEVINSKY & D'EsPosiro,
supra note 31, at 63-64, 67 nn.93-104 (discussing clinical applications of fMRI and citing
twelve other studies).
120 Indeed, the objectivity and validity of the criteria proposed in AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter DSM-IV], have long been a matter of discussion and controversy. See, e.g.,
Peter S. Jensen & Kimberly Hoagwood, The Book of Names: DSM-IV in Context, 9 DEV.
& PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 231, 231 (1997) ("[C]ontroversies continue concerning the validity
of these taxonomies, as well as about the types of measures and instruments purported to
measure the psychopathologic constructs." (citations omitted)).
121 Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 14.
122 See id. ("For example, central to Buddhism is the Doctrine of No-Soul, whereas in
Hinduism, the self is a religious and metaphysical concept. Even within Western traditions,
that may appear to be monolithic, various beliefs have served as 'sources of the self."'
(citations omitted)).
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neuroimaging to provide seemingly objective and transparent insight
into morally and socially relevant behaviors. 123
C. Neuroimaging and the Law Generally
Developments in neuroimaging have affected the law both
directly and indirectly. The indirect developments are visible in the
great deal of discussion that has occurred about speculative applica-
tions of nascent technological innovations. The direct impact has
occurred where neuroimaging evidence has been introduced in court-
rooms and has led to the creation of a body of decisional law that has
shaped the legal landscape in this domain.
Henry Greely has provided an excellent account of the specula-
tive uses of neuroimaging in the legal context. He suggests that such
technology might eventually be used in the courtroom to detect lies or
to compel truth, to determine bias (on the part of jurors, witnesses, or
parties), to elicit or evaluate memory, to determine competency (e.g.,
to stand trial, to be executed, or to make medical decisions), to prove
the presence of intractable pain, to prove addiction (or susceptibility
thereto), to show a disposition to sexual deviance or predatory
impulses (for purposes of involuntary civil commitment), or to show
future dangerousness. 124
As for actual applications, neuroimaging evidence has been prof-
fered and admitted in a variety of jurisdictions, in both civil and crim-
123 See, e.g., Farah & Wolpe, supra note 34, at 40 (observing that potential utility of
neuroimaging for employers, schools, military, and legal systems, "coupled with the inevi-
table misunderstandings of brain imaging among the lay public, sets the stage for misuse");
Illes & Racine, supra note 56, at 13 ("With dynamic images in hand, we may forget the
epistemological limits of how the images were produced, including variability in research
designs, statistical treatment of the data, and resolution."). As always, it bears noting that
a functional neuroimage is not a photograph of the brain, but rather "a computer-gener-
ated visual representation of numerical measurements-in this case, measurements of a
physiological event." Kulynych, supra note 25, at 1254.
124 Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy and Property: Some Possible Legal
and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW,
supra note 6, at 114, 127-48. An additional potential application of neuroimaging to the
criminal context is in showing subjective predispositions to a particular criminal activity for
the purpose of defeating entrapment defenses. To prevail against a claim of entrapment,
the government must prove that the defendant already had the predisposition to engage in
the criminal activity at issue, such that the government merely facilitated its commission.
See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992) ("[When] the defense of entrap-
ment is at issue ... the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by
Government agents."); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1973) ("It is only
when the Government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the
defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play.").
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inal cases and for a variety of purposes. 125 However, it is difficult to
analyze the use of neuroimaging in actual litigation. Many cases in
which neuroimaging evidence is introduced may be unreported. Still
others may be resolved through informal means, such as settlement or
plea agreement. To the extent that such cases can be identified, it is
often impossible to reliably discern the role that neuroimaging evi-
dence played in the outcome. What follows is a very brief survey of
some circumstances in which neuroimaging evidence has been both
introduced and admitted.
In the civil context, neuroimaging has been proffered and
admitted to prove actual harm (and, to a lesser extent, causation) in
personal injury cases involving toxic exposure, 126 claims under the
National Vaccine Act, 127 head injuries, 128 and medical malpractice.12 9
125 Neuroimaging evidence has been admitted in jurisdictions that follow the standard
for the admissibility of scientific and expert testimony (under FED. R. EVID. 702)
announced in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)
(holding that trial judge must determine whether expert testimony is both "relevant" and
"reliable"), and refined by General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-43 (1997)
(holding that trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is subject to review
for abuse of discretion), and Kumho Tire, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 150-51
(1999) (holding that Daubert applies to all expert testimony and that Daubert factors are
"helpful, not definitive"), as well as in those jurisdictions that follow the older standard
announced in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that expert
testimony must be based on knowledge that has "gained general acceptance in the partic-
ular field"). See An Overview of the Impact of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Law
(2004) (President's Council on Bioethics Staff Working Paper), available at http://www.
bioethics.gov/background/neuroscience-evidence.html (discussing cases in both Frye and
Daubert jurisdictions in which neuroimaging evidence was admitted).
126 E.g., Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1995) (PET evidence
admitted to show injuries consistent with manganese encephalopathy); Rhilinger v.
Jancsics, No. 932223, 1998 WL 1182058, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1998) (holding that
use of SPECT to show injuries consistent with toxic encephalopathy was "scientifically
reliable" under Daubert). But see Summers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Sys., 897 F. Supp. 533, 540
(E.D. Okla. 1995) (excluding expert testimony that relied heavily on SPECT to diagnose
neurotoxic exposure).
127 E.g., Bushell v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 91-1270V, 1993 WL 212472, at
*2-4 (Fed. Cl. June 3, 1993) (deeming PET evidence relevant and credible to expert's claim
that DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus) vaccine did not cause seizures). But see Gardner-
Cook v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 59 Fed. Cl. 38, 41-42, 49 (2003) (affirming
finding that neither SPECT nor PET were admissible for diagnosing brain injury in
question).
128 E.g., Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Ret. Plan, 410 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th
Cir. 2005) (considering SPECT scan presented by plaintiff in attempt to prove causation
and injury in ERISA claim arising from football head injury); Fini v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
No. 227592, 2003 WL 1861025, at *2-5 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2003) (affirming trial court's
finding that SPECT evidence was admissible under Frye to prove head injuries from auto-
mobile accident); Baxter v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 02AP-537, 2002 WL 31838505, at
*4-7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002) (finding that trial court erred in disregarding plaintiff's
SPECT evidence showing diminished brain activity after automobile accident). But see
Penney v. Praxair, Inc., 116 F.3d 330, 332-33 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting lower court's finding
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In a recent suit by a video game industry trade association to enjoin
the enforcement of the Illinois Violent Video Games Law (VVGL) 130
and Sexually Explicit Video Games Law (SEVGL),13' a federal dis-
trict court admitted fMRI evidence to show a relationship between
playing violent video games and aggressive behavior in children. 32
The fMRI evidence was tendered in support of the government's
argument that it had a compelling state interest in regulating violent
games.1 33 In contract disputes, neuroimaging has been admitted-and
has been found persuasive by fact finders-to show that one of the
parties lacked sufficient cognitive capacity to form a valid contract.134
In the criminal context, defendants have proffered neuroimaging
evidence at various stages of the process for a variety of purposes. For
instance, courts have admitted neuroimaging evidence (or have held
that a defendant was entitled to undergo neuroimaging tests) in con-
nection with claims of mental incompetence. 135 Defendants have had
mixed success in seeking to admit neuroimaging evidence to show
diminished capacity (or an inability to formulate requisite mens rea)
at the guilt phase of criminal trials136 or as an adjunct to their insanity
that PET evidence would "not be helpful to the jury in deciding the issues when compared
with the likelihood that the jury would misapply the evidence" and affirming lower court's
holding on new grounds that "plaintiffs failed to establish a sufficient foundation" to show
that evidence was reliable).
129 See, e.g., Matuszak v. Cerniak, 805 N.E.2d 681, 683-84 (I11. App. Ct. 2004) (affirming
trial court's decision to admit SPECT evidence to demonstrate actual harm and to find that
it did not establish causation).
130 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12A-1 to -25 (West Supp. 2007).
131 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12B-1 to -35 (West Supp. 2007).
132 Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1063-67 (N.D. I11. 2005).
133 See id. (admitting fMRI evidence but ultimately rejecting government's "compelling
interest" claim and noting that fMRI evidence was not yet convincing or conclusive).
134 Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank & Trust Co., No. 215512, 2000 WL 33421451, at
*2-4 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5, 2000) (contract held voidable based in part on MRI showing
brain shrinkage and hardening of arteries consistent with dementia). For an extended
survey and discussion of various civil cases involving neuroimaging evidence, see 0. Carter
Snead, Neuroimaging and the Courts: Standards and Illustrative Case Index, Presentation
at Judicial Seminar on Emerging Neuroscience Issues 2-6 (June 29, 2006), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/d-research/stl/June06/Snead.doc.
135 However, courts sometimes find such evidence, once admitted, to be unpersuasive.
See, e.g., United States v. Hammer, 404 F. Supp. 2d 676, 722-25 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (enter-
taining MRI, PET, and computerized neuropsychological testing evidence but ultimately
finding it unpersuasive as to competency); United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140,
147-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding PET scan evidence unreliable and unconvincing); State v.
Marshall, 27 P.3d 192, 199 (Wash. 2001) (holding that, where competency is at issue at time
of trial, sentencing, or punishment, defendant is entitled to assistance of expert testimony
and testing, here including neuroimaging (MRI)).
136 See, e.g., United States v. Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661, 674-75 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(holding PET scan inadmissible because scan was not relevant to whether defendant had
"capacity to deceive" or requisite mens rea for charges); People v. Yum, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d
855, 857 (Ct. App. 2003) (barring SPECT evidence offered to show diminished capacity
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defenses. 137 The most famous example of neuroimaging being used in
an insanity defense is the case of John Hinckley, Jr., who attempted to
assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1981. There, the court
admitted a CT scan to show that Hinckley's brain had atrophied,
which the defense argued-over the vigorous argument of the govern-
ment's expert-was evidence of organic brain disease. 138
Defendants have enjoyed the greatest success with neuroimaging
evidence at the sentencing phase of capital trials in connection with
mitigation claims. 139 In support of these claims, experts have invoked
cutting-edge neuroimaging research on the biological correlates of
criminal violence, described in full immediately below.
D. Neurological Bases of Criminal Violence
The foundation for using neuroimaging evidence in criminal
trials-and for both the short- and long-term aims of the cognitive
neuroscience project-lies in a massive (and growing) body of scien-
tific literature on both the neuroanatomical 40 and neurochemical 41
because SPECT had not become "generally accepted" for that purpose); People v.
Protsman, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 822-23 (Ct. App. 2001) (barring PET scan evidence intro-
duced to show lack of capacity to formulate intent for first-degree murder because relevant
scientific community had "not generally accepted" use of PET to detect or evaluate long-
term impact of brain traumas). But see People v. Erskine, 588 F.2d 721, 722 (9th Cir. 1978)
(reversing lower court's exclusion of brain scan evidence in support of defendant's claim
that he lacked capacity to formulate requisite specific intent to "influence action by [a]
financial institution" through knowingly false statement or report); Martin Lasden, Mr.
Chiesa's Brain, CAL. LAW., Nov. 2004, at 26, 27-29 (reporting case of Peter J. Chiesa, who
successfully introduced SPECT evidence to show diminished capacity and was convicted of
second-degree murder even though prosecutor sought first-degree conviction).
137 E.g., People v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 724 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (admitting PET scan
showing arachnoid cyst in defendant's frontal lobe). According to newspaper reports, the
Weinstein court's decision to admit the PET evidence motivated the prosecution to offer a
favorable plea bargain. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 49 ("[Tjhe prosecution team seemed to fear that simply exhibiting
images of Weinstein's brain in court would sway the jury."); cf. J. Rojas-Burke, PET Scans
Advance as Tools in Insanity Defense, 34 J. NUCLEAR MED. 13N, 26N (1993) ("[Weinstein's
attorney] claims that the prosecutor would never have agreed to a plea if the judge had
excluded the PET evidence."). For a further description of the neuroimaging evidence
admitted in Weinstein, see Kulynych, supra note 25, at 1251.
138 Laura A. Kiernan, Hinckley Judge Reverses Himself Admits Pictures of Defendant's
Brain, WASH. POST, Jun. 2, 1982, at A3. Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of
insanity.
139 See infra Part III.A.
140 That is, theories of violence focusing on the structure and function of the brain.
141 There are several studies that test hypotheses about the neurotransmitters that are
thought to serve excitatory and inhibitory functions in this manner. For example, some
researchers have examined the inhibitory effects of the neurotransmitter serotonin. E.g.,
Emil F. Coccaro et al., Impulsive Aggression in Personality Disorder Correlates with Triti-
ated Paroxetine Binding in the Platelet, 53 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 531 (1998). Others
have examined the excitatory function of noradrenaline (also known as norepinephrine).
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bases for the various types of violence (i.e., reactive, instrumental,
impulsive, and premeditated). 42 In 1998 and 1999, an interdiscipli-
nary group of experts were convened under the auspices of the Aspen
Neurobehavioral Conference to create a consensus statement on the
relationship between the mind, the brain, and violence. 143 To this end,
they conducted an exhaustive literature survey of the role of the brain
in violent behavior and issued a statement in 2001 noting that the
limbic system and the frontal lobes "are thought to play preeminent
roles in [violent] behavior."'144 The statement asserted that:
Aggressive behavior has been thought to arise from the operations
of the limbic system under certain circumstances, and the amygdala
is the structure most often implicated. . . [P]refrontal functions
may ... provide an individual with the capacity to exercise judg-
ment in the setting of complex social situations in which actions
have significant consequences. In many cases, this capacity for
judgment may serve the important function of inhibiting limbic
impulses, which, if acted on, could be socially inappropriate or
destructive .... Therefore, there exists a balance between the poten-
tial for impulsive aggression mediated by temporolimbic structures
and the control of this drive by the influence of the orbitofrontal
regions. 145
This theory of violence was informed, and has been reinforced by,
neuroimaging studies. The first such study was published in 1994 by
Adrian Raine, who used PET to illustrate diminished activity of the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) of individuals accused of murder.1 46 In many
of Raine's subsequent works, the PFC-limbic-system model of vio-
lence sketched out in the consensus statement figures prominently. 47
E.g., Gilberto Gerra et al., Neurotransmitter-Neuroendocrine Responses to Experimentally
Induced Aggression in Humans: Influence of Personality Variable, 66 PSYCHIATRY RES. 33
(1997).
142 See Mrigendra Das et al., Neuroimaging Violence in the Mentally Ill: What Can It Tell
Us?, 63 Hosp. MED. 604,606 (2002) (setting forth similar typology of violence and defining
"reactive" as "response to frustration or threat," "instrumental" as "purposeful and goal
directed," "impulsive" as "sudden, without planning," and "premeditated" as "planned").
143 Christopher M. Filley et al., Toward an Understanding of Violence: Neurobiological
Aspects of Unwarranted Physical Aggression: Aspen Neurobehavioral Conference Con-
sensus Statement, 14 NEUROPSYCHIATRY NEUROPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. NEUROLOGY 1, 1
(2001).
144 Id. at 5.
145 Id.
146 Adrian Raine et al., Selective Reductions in Prefrontal Glucose Metabolism in Mur-
derers, 36 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 365,365-66, 370-71 (1994). Raine confirmed his find-
ings in a paper published in 1997. Adrian Raine et al., Brain Abnormalities in Murderers
Indicated by Positron Emission Tomography, 42 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 495 (1997).
147 See, e.g., Adrian Raine et al., Prefrontal Glucose Deficits in Murderers Lacking
Psychosocial Deprivation, 11 NEUROPSYCHIATRY NEUROPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. NEU-
ROLOGY 1, 2 (1998) (examining whether "prefrontal dysfunction may specifically charac-
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Other articles surveying the neuroimaging literature similarly affirm
the widespread association of prefrontal dysfunction and violence. 148
Further literature reviews 149 and articles written by prominent neuros-
cientists150 have reached similar conclusions.
In addition to the iconic case of Phineas Gage,151 there are
striking modern examples of the relationship between frontal lobe
injuries (or dysfunction) and a disposition to criminal violence. For
example, following a concussive injury to his prefrontal cortex, Louis
Culpepper found himself no longer able to restrain his impulses to
molest his five-year-old stepdaughter. 152 In a similar case, following
the development of an egg-sized tumor in his prefrontal lobe, a school
teacher with no criminal record and a stable marriage found himself
unable to restrain his impulses to view child pornography, solicit sex,
and make sexual overtures to his stepdaughter.1 53 Once the tumor
was removed, his inhibitions and capacity for self-restraint were
restored. 54 A more recent example is Andrew Laing, who lost all
terize violent offenders who lack psychosocial deficits"); Adrian Raine et al., Reduced
Prefrontal and Increased Subcortical Brain Functioning Assessed Using Positron Emission
Tomography in Predatory and Affective Murderers, 16 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 319, 321 (1998)
(assessing "differences between affective and predatory murderers in cortical and subcor-
tical brain functioning").
148 Following a 2005 review of seventeen neuroimaging studies of aggressive, violent,
and antisocial patients, Jana L. Bufkin and Vickie R. Luttrell concluded that prefrontal
dysfunction is "consistently related to aggressive and/or violent behavior," although "this
association may reflect a predisposition only." Bufkin & Luttrell, supra note 20, at 182.
They also suggested that "reduced prefrontal functioning relative to subcortical functioning
was characteristic of those who commit impulsive [but not predatory] acts of aggression
and/or violence." Id. at 183.
149 See M.C. Brower & B.H. Price, Neuropsychiatry of Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in Vio-
lent and Criminal Behaviour. A Critical Review, 71 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY &
PSYCHIATRY 720, 722-23 (2001) (surveying eighteen neuroimaging or neuropsychological
studies touching on frontal lobe dysfunction and violent behavior); Das et al., supra note
142, at 607 (reviewing fourteen neuroimaging studies).
150 See, e.g., Richard L. Frierson & Ryan D. Finkenbine, Psychiatric and Neurological
Characteristics of Murder Defendants Referred for Pretrial Evaluation, 49 J. FORENSIC SCI.
604, 605 (2004) (discussing studies observing frontal lobe dysfunction in murderers); see
also Ian Barkataki et al., A Neuropsychological Investigation into Violence and Mental Ill-
ness, 74 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 1, 9-11 (2005) (finding different cognitive impairments to
have a neuropsychological basis in PFC dysfunction, manifested in antisocial personality
disorder (APD) and schizophrenia); Richard J. Davidson et al., Dysfunction in the Neural
Circuitry of Emotion Regulation-A Possible Prelude to Violence, 289 SCIENCE 591, 593-94
(2000) (positing that impulsive aggression and violence arise as consequence of faulty brain
circuitry responsible for emotional regulation); Sapolsky, supra note 15, at 1789-90 (ques-
tioning M'Naughten rule of insanity in light of neuroscience evidence regarding conse-
quences of PFC impairment).
151 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
152 JONATHAN PINCUS, BASE INSTINCTS: WHAT MAKES KILLERS KILL? 15-19 (2001).
153 Thompson, supra note 16, at 50-51.
154 Id.
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sexual inhibitions and sense of propriety following a concussive injury
to his prefrontal lobe in a skiing accident. 155
1. Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder
A significant and growing area of research on the disposition to
criminal violence concerns the neurobiological correlates of psychop-
athy and antisocial personality disorder (APD). 156 Psychopathy is
defined as "a cluster of personality traits including manipulativeness,
lack of empathy, and impulsivity."'1 57 As noted in an amicus brief filed
by the American Psychological Association (APA) in Roper v.
Simmons, 158 "psychopathy is presumed to be deep seated, stable over
time, and resistant, if not absolutely impervious, to change.1 59 APD
155 See Becky Sheaves, The Freak Accident that Left My Son Obsessed with Sex, DAILY
MAIL (London), July 4, 2006, at 49 (describing Laing's aggressive and bizarre behavior,
sexual risk-taking, and inability to understand social cues or body language after damage to
frontal lobe).
156 Regardless of whether neuroscience evidence is used at trial, APD and psychopathy
diagnoses are often used by the prosecution to argue that a capital defendant presents a
future danger. See infra Part III.B.
157 John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Pris-
oners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 421 (2006). The first American study of
psychopathy was undertaken in 1941, culminating in HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF
SANITY: AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY SOME ISSUES ABOUT THE So-CALLED PSYCHOPATHIC
PERSONALITY (3d ed. 1955). The term "sociopathy" was introduced by G.E. Partridge in
his 1930 work, Current Conceptions of Psychopathic Personality, 10 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 53,
55 (1930). Other early expressions for psychopathy included "mania without delerium"
and "moral insanity." See PHILIPPE PINEL, A TREATISE ON INSANITY ix (D.D. Davis trans.,
Hafner Publ'g photo. reprint 1962) (1806); JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, A TREATISE ON
INSANITY AND OTHER DISORDERS AFFECTING THE MIND Vii (London, Sherwood, Gilbert
& Piper 1835).
158 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
159 Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n & the Missouri Psychological Ass'n as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 20, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2006) (No.
03-633) [hereinafter APA Brief]. The brief argues that psychopathy
is an adult personality feature defined chiefly by a combination of antisocial
behavior, callousness, and emotional detachment. Psychopaths have been
described as "[l]acking in conscience and in feeling for others, [and] . .. cold-
bloodedly tak[ing] what they want and do[ing] what they please, violating
social norms and expectations without the slightest sense of guilt or regret."
Unlike disorders such as depression, psychopathy is presumed to be deep
seated, stable over time, and resistant, if not absolutely impervious, to change.
Some experts have gone so far as to conclude that "at this time there is no
empirical evidence to suggest that psychopathy is treatable." As a group, psy-
chopaths "are responsible for a markedly disproportionate amount of the
serious crime, violence and social distress in every society."...
Evidence of psychopathy can strongly encourage the imposition of the
death penalty in a particular case. Indeed, some of the cases which have
shaped the Court's death sentencing jurisprudence have centered on evidence
of psychopathic tendencies.
Id. at 20-21 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). But see Mark D.
Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Antisocial Personality Disorder and Psychopathy: Diag-
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is a related diagnostic construct of the DSM-IV that is based on
behavioral characteristics such as "a pervasive pattern of disregard
for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or
early adolescence and continues into adulthood. '160
A recent literature survey reviewed five structural and fifteen
functional neuroimaging studies relating to APD and psychopathy
that were published in the last decade. 161 While careful to note the
difficulties in comparing such studies,1 62 the paper tentatively con-
cluded that "[t]he functional but not the structural neuroimaging
[studies] strongly suggest dysfunction of the frontal and temporal
lobes, and possibly other structures including the angular gyrus and
corpus callosum, in psychopathy. However, replication studies are
required before conclusions can be drawn. ' 163 In other words, the
structural studies of the brain were inconclusive, whereas the func-
tional studies revealed a striking connection between abnormal brain
activity and psychopathy (though more study is needed before this can
be confirmed).
In addition to his work on the neurological bases of violence,
Adrian Raine is also responsible for the first article showing a struc-
nostic Dilemmas in Classifying Patterns of Antisocial Behavior in Sentencing Evaluations,
16 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 333, 345-46 (1998) (noting that "treatment intervention studies with
psychopaths are sparse and contradictory" but observing that effectiveness of treatment is
not promising for severe psychopaths).
160 DSM-IV, supra note 120, at 645. For an in-depth discussion of the diagnostic criteria
for APD, see John H. Blume & David P. Voisin, Capital Cases, 24 CHAMPION 69, 70-73
(2000). It has been observed that there is a strong correlation between psychopathy and
APD; one study found that 87.7% of inmates diagnosed with psychopathy (defined as a
score of above 30 on the Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R)) also satisfied the cri-
teria for APD. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 159, at 341. Nevertheless, some promi-
nent experts in the field of risk assessment have cautioned against equating psychopathy
and APD, noting that the two conditions reflect different criteria. See, e.g., Robert D.
Hare, Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder: A Case of Diagnostic Confusion,
13 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 39 (1996) (noting that distinction between psychopathy and APD
often is blurred). Hare, who developed the PCL-R, the most effective psychopathy risk
assessment instrument, argues that while psychopathy is highly predictive of recidivist vio-
lence, a diagnosis of APD is much less reliable. Id. Cunningham and Reidy agree, arguing
that "APD has not demonstrated satisfactory performance as a predictor of criminality,
institutional violence, and violent recidivism ...." Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 159,
at 347.
161 Saxby Pridmore et al., Neuroimaging in Psychopathy, 39 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 856 (2005).
162 Pridmore and his coauthors noted that comparative difficulties arose from differ-
ences in methods used among the studies reviewed, as well as from problems in selecting
homogeneous index cases and appropriate control groups. Id. at 862-63. For these rea-
sons, the paper does not offer conclusions as to the five structural studies. Id.
163 Id. at 863.
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tural brain deficit in subjects with APD. 164 Based on his research,
Raine tentatively concluded that this structural deficit "may underlie
the low arousal, poor fear conditioning, lack of conscience, and deci-
sion-making deficits that have been found to characterize antisocial,
psychopathic behavior. ' 165 He has also found abnormally high white
matter volume in the corpus callosa (the band of tissue connecting the
left and right hemispheres of the brain) of "psychopathic antisocial
individuals" (as measured by the Psychopathy Checklist Revised
(PCL-R)). 166 Raine has speculated that this abnormality might impair
interhemispheric communication in a way that bears on the affective
deficits typical of psychopaths. 67
Many other prominent neuroscientists likewise have undertaken
inquiries using neuroimaging tools to explore the potential connection
between brain abnormalities and violence. 168 By linking brain abnor-
164 Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume and Reduced Auto-
nomic Activity in Antisocial Personality Disorder, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 119,125
(2000) (noting eleven-percent reduction in gray matter in prefrontal cortex of subjects
with APD).
165 Id. at 119.
166 Adrian Raine et al., Corpus Callosum Abnormalities in Psychopathic Antisocial Indi-
viduals, 60 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1134, 1135, 1137, 1138 tbl.2 (2003).
167 Id. at 1134. Similarly, Raine has published articles identifying, for the first time,
structural brain abnormalities in a particular subcategory of psychopath (psychopaths who
are considered "unsuccessful" because they were not able to avoid capture and prosecution
by law enforcement). Adrian Raine et al., Hippocampal Structural Asymmetry in Unsuc-
cessful Psychopaths, 55 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 185 (2004); Yaling Yang, Adrian Raine
et al., Volume Reduction in Prefrontal Gray Matter in Unsuccessful Criminal Psychopaths,
57 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1103 (2005). In addition, Raine has numerous other publica-
tions exploring the relationship between psychopathy (or APD) and the structure and
function of the brain. E.g., Adrian Raine, Psychopathy, Violence, and Brain Imaging, in
VIOLENCE AND PSYCHOPATHY 35, 35-57 (Adrian Raine & Jos6 Sanmartfn eds., 2001).
168 E.g., Antoine Bechara et al., Insensitivity to Future Consequences Following Damage
to Human Prefrontal Cortex, 50 COGNITION 7, 8 (1994) (demonstrating connection
between prefrontal lobe damage and impaired decisionmaking through neuropsychological
testing); R. James R. Blair, Editorial, Neurobiological Basis of Psychopathy, 182 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 5 (2003) (discussing neuroimaging studies finding association between amyg-
dala dysfunction and psychopathy and noting probable impairment of orbitofrontal cortex
in psychopathic individuals); R.J.R. Blair, Neurocognitive Models of Aggression, the Anti-
social Personality Disorders, and Psychopathy, 71 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSY-
CHIATRY 727 (2001) (discussing neurocognitive models of aggression and relating them to
explanations of APD); Antonio R. Damasio, A Neural Basis for Sociopathy, 57 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 128, 128-29 (2000) (noting that Raine's paper on reduction in prefrontal
white matter volume in psychopaths, Raine et al., supra note 164, bolsters hypothesis that
"the symptoms of developmental sociopathic individuals are related to the malfunction of
neural systems, which include critical components in the prefrontal cortex"); Kent A. Kiehl
et al., Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by Criminal Psychopaths as Revealed
by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 677 (2001)
(working with PCL-R creator Hare to use fMRI to examine correlation between affective
processing anomalies typically found in criminal psychopaths and deficient input from
limbic structures).
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malities to specific behaviors-and, specifically, to violent behavior-
these studies provide a foundation for the use of neuroimaging evi-
dence in criminal trials.
II
THE ASPIRATIONS OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE FOR
CAPITAL SENTENCING
A. Short-Term Aim: Aiding Capital Defendants
The short-term aim of cognitive neuroscientists for capital sen-
tencing is straightforward. Their goal is to bolster defendants' mitiga-
tion claims with cutting-edge neuroimaging research that
demonstrates a biological disposition to criminal violence. To elabo-
rate the contours of this short-term project, this section first provides
a very cursory sketch of the capital sentencing process and locates the
efforts of cognitive neuroscientists within this framework. Next, the
section briefly introduces the general approaches used by neuroscien-
tists to assist capital defendants. Third, it uses the recent case of
Roper v. Simmons as a point of departure to illustrate the method-
ology and strategies of cognitive neuroscientists in this field. Part II.A
concludes with an appraisal of the success of the short-term aspira-
tions to date, measured both by the rate of success at getting
neuroimaging evidence before capital juries at sentencing and by the
ultimate persuasive force of such evidence.
To fully appreciate the short-term aims of cognitive neuroscien-
tists for capital sentencing, it is necessary first to understand the pro-
cedural context in which these aims are pursued. While the precise
procedures vary from state to state, virtually all capital sentencing
regimes direct the jury to evaluate mitigating 69 and aggravating 170
factors in considering whether to impose the death penalty. 171 The
169 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4626 (Supp. 2006) (listing several common statutory
mitigating factors, such as lack of prior criminal history, minor or accomplice role in crime
commited by another, "the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbances," and
when defendant's capacity "to appreciate the criminality of [his] conduct or to conform
[his] conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired").
170 See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592-93 & n.1 (2002) (listing statutory aggra-
vating factors, including prior conviction for "serious offense," commission of offense for
"anything of pecuniary value," and commission of offense "in an especially heinous, cruel
or depraved manner") (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (2001)); Jonathan Simon
& Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregu-
lated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS,
AND CULTURE 81, 91 tbl.4.2 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999) (listing aggravating factors in various
states).
171 See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2524-25 (2006) (noting that states may weigh
aggravating and mitigating factors as they please, provided they observe fundamental prin-
ciples of Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that all capital sentencing
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consideration of mitigating evidence is central to the constitutional
requirement of individualized sentencing. 172 The Supreme Court has
held that defendants enjoy wide latitude in their presentation of miti-
gating evidence bearing on "any aspect of [the] defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defen-
dant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. ' 173 It is typical
for defense experts to testify about the mitigating effects of mental
illness or brain damage in an attempt to persuade jurors that a defen-
dant is less than fully culpable and should receive a sentence of life
imprisonment rather than death. 174 It is within this procedural frame-
work that cognitive neuroscientists have sought to wield their tools on
behalf of defendants facing the death penalty.
Reported cases175 and public commentary176 demonstrate that
cognitive neuroscientists are increasingly contributing to the mitiga-
schemes must "(1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; and (2) permit
a jury to render a reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-
eligible defendant's record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime").
For a discussion of different approaches to comparing aggravating and mitigating factors,
see James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The Sentencing Provi-
sions in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 19, 33-52 (1995).
172 See Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2525 (describing role of mitigating evidence in allowing
sentencer to evaluate defendant as individual, as required by Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
173 Id. (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
174 See Frierson & Finkenbine, supra note 150, at 604 ("In death penalty cases a history
of mental illness or organic brain impairment is frequently used by the defense for the
purpose of mitigation ...."); Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Ethics Questions Raised by the
Neuropsychiatric, Neuropsychological, Educational, Developmental, and Family Character-
istics of 18 Juveniles Awaiting Execution in Texas, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 408,
427 (2004) (arguing that results of neurological evaluations would be relevant to mitiga-
tion, if not culpability, for violent juvenile offenders); Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental
Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 298
(1989) (describing research showing that many death row inmates are mentally ill).
175 See, e.g., People v. Kraft, 5 P.3d 68, 98 (Cal. 2000) (describing introduction of PET
scan as mitigating evidence showing defendant's brain abnormalities); People v. Holt, 937
P.2d 213, 231 (Cal. 1997) (admitting PET and EEG scans as part of mitigation claim);
Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 998-99 (Fla. 2001) (upholding trial court's grant of funds
for MRI scan, but not PET scan, for defendant's mitigation case); Robinson v. State, 761
So. 2d 269, 275 (Fla. 1999) (affirming trial court's denial of defendant's request to admit
SPECT scan for use in mitigation case); Hoskins v. State, 735 So. 2d 1281, 1281 (Fla. 1999)
(vacating death sentence for trial court's failure to allow PET scan as mitigating evidence);
People v. Jones, 620 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657-58 (App. Div. 1994) (reversing trial court's refusal
to admit neuroscience evidence as part of mitigation case); Ex parte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d
660, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (describing introduction of EEG and MRI evidence to
support claim of mental retardation); Steve Emmons, Hunting for Brain Disorders, Attor-
neys Turn to UCI Scanner as Defense Tool, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1989, § 2, at 1 (describing
case of Ramon Salcido, who introduced PET scan evidence as part of his mitigation case).
176 See, e.g., THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (Joseph Glicksohn ed.,
2002) (compiling neuroscience research on criminal behavior); PINCUS, supra note 152, at
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tion efforts of capital defendants. A significant group of
neuroimaging experts has aided capital defendants in constructing
their mitigation cases, testifying and using SPECT 177 and PET178 scans
on the behalf of defendants at trial. Some experts have also con-
35 (noting that "many [criminal] defense attorneys" are interested in finding possible neu-
rological "abnormalities that could mitigate the death sentences of their clients"); Allison
Abbott, Into the Mind of a Killer, 410 NATURE 296 (2001) (describing debate over use of
neuroscience in criminal justice system); James J. Clark et al., The Fiend Unmasked:
Developing the Mental Health Dimensions of the Defense, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1993, at
22, 23 (describing ways in which defense attorneys litigating on behalf of "troubled
client[s]" can benefit from using mental health consultants); Das et al., supra note 142, at
604-05 (arguing that findings in neuroimaging will have broad social ramifications); Robert
L. Denney, Criminal Responsibility and Other Forensic Issues, in FORENSIC NEURO-
PSYCHOLOGY: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH 425, 445-52 (Glenn J. Larrabee ed., 2005) (dis-
cussing role of neuropsychologists in death penalty cases); Lasden, supra note 136, at 30,
61-62 (offering examples of use of neuroscience testimony in death penalty cases); R.K.
McKinzey, A Judge's Introduction to Neuropsychological Assessments, COURT REV.,
Winter 2001, at 24 (providing attorneys with expert advice regarding possible brain damage
in clients charged with capital offenses); Alison Motluk, Not Guilty, NEW SCIENTIST, May
13, 2000, at 42, 44-45 (noting support among neuroscientists for use of neuroimaging evi-
dence in assessing degree of criminal responsibility); Adrian Raine, Murderous Minds:
Can We See the Mark of Cain?, 1 CEREBRUM 15, 16 (1999) ("Because California has the
death penalty, [defendants] will die unless mitigating circumstances such as an abnormal
PET scan revealing brain abnormalities can be found."); Jesse A. Seiden, The Criminal
Brain: Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Evidence in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395, 397
(2004) (discussing "effect of frontal lobe dysfunction on behavior and the most effective
use of such evidence in a capital murder case"); Thompson, supra note 16, at 51 (describing
debate over relationship between brain structure and control over actions, including
"moral and legal choices"); Judy Foreman, Brain Scans Draw a Dark Image of the Violent
Mind, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 2002, at B9 (describing research on link between brain
structure and predisposition towards violence); Laura Mansnerus, Damaged Brains and the
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at B9 ("[L]egal scholars say new findings on
brain dysfunction are finally gaining attention . . . in death penalty cases."); Michael
McGough, My Brain Made Me Do It: What Happens to Guilt and Innocence When an MRI
Can Tell You Who Is Likely to Commit a Violent Crime?, PIrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
June 6, 2006, at B7 (discussing questions raised by neuroscience research about traditional
notions of culpability); Suzy Hansen, The Mind of a Killer, SALON.COM, July 27, 2001,
http://archive.salon.com/books/int/2001/07/27/killers/index2.html (interviewing neuroscien-
tist Jonathan Pincus regarding link between violence and neurological damage).
177 One such expert is Dr. Daniel Amen, who regularly testifies in capital trials using
SPECT scans of the defendant's brain as an adjunct to his testimony. Lasden, supra note
136, at 28.
178 Joseph Wu, Clinical Director of the University of California-Irvine Brain Imaging
Center, uses PET scans in his work on behalf of defendants in murder trials. Id. at 29.
One judge pejoratively referred to Wu as a "hired gun anxious to make the PET scan the
instrument of truth." Id. at 61 (citing Jackson v. Calderon, No. CV 91-4249-R, 1997 WL
855516, at *73 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 1997)). Wu trained under Monte Buchsbaum, who pio-
neered the use of PET scanning in capital defense work in the mid-1980s. Id. Since then,
Buchsbaum has testified in numerous criminal trials (including many capital sentencing
hearings), invoking PET scan evidence for purposes of mitigation. See Monte Buchsbaum,
Use and Admissibility of Positron Emission Tomography (PET) Scanning in Head Injury,
Presentation at the Judicial Seminar on Emerging Issues in Neuroscience Conference 27
(June 29, 2006), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/d-research/st/June06/Buchsbaum.
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ducted studies that dovetail with the needs of capital defendants. For
example, Raine and Monte Buchsbaum were coauthors of the first
PET-scan-based study of the brain function of murderers. 179 Raine
has gone on to eloquently defend the use of his research as a mecha-
nism for persuading juries (and society more broadly) that capital
defendants should receive life sentences rather than the death pen-
alty. 180 Numerous other neuroimaging practitioners work on behalf of
defendants at the sentencing phase of capital trials, using EEGs,
QEEGs, and other methods to supplement their own testimony. 181
Other cognitive neuroscientists who have not personally testified in
capital trials have expressed support for the use of neuroscience testi-
mony in this and related contexts. 182
What kinds of mitigation claims do cognitive neuroscientists (and
other practitioners of neuroimaging) make on behalf of capital defen-
dants? What kinds of research do they invoke? In short, they argue
that, although it does not provide an excuse for purposes of legal guilt,
dysfunction in the violence-inhibitory mechanisms of a defendant's
brain sufficiently diminishes his moral responsibility such that he
deserves a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death. In sup-
port of these claims, such experts invoke cutting-edge neuroimaging
research on the biological correlates of criminal violence. 183
Roper v. Simmons, perhaps the most high-profile example of
neuroimaging in the capital context, provides a useful example of pre-
cisely how cognitive neuroscientists invoke the growing body of
research on criminal violence and the brain on behalf of capital defen-
ppt (noting types of mitigative evidence); see also Lasden, supra note 136, at 30 (describing
work of Adrian Raine in testifying for defense in capital trials using PET scan evidence).
179 Raine et al., supra note 146.
180 ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS A
CLINICAL DISORDER 312 (1993) ("If we accept crime is a disorder.., then the implication
is that criminal offenders should not be punished as severely as they are currently for their
actions."); see also Motluk, supra note 176, at 45 (interviewing Raine and noting his state-
ment that "I think we have to think twice about whether we execute these people"); Raine,
supra note 176, at 25-26 (questioning whether brain-damaged murderers deserve to lose
their lives "given the demonstrable constraints on [their] free will"); Sue Lindsay, Rape,
Slaying Suspect Was Beaten as Child, His Grandmother Testifies, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS
(Denver), Nov. 10, 2000, at 22A (describing testimony of Raine in capital murder trial of
defendant beaten and shaken as child).
181 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 101-02 (3d Cir. 2005) (admitting testimony of
neuroscientist Dr. Patricia Fleming on behalf of capital defendant); Johnston v. State, 841
So. 2d 349, 353-54 (Fla. 2002) (describing testimony of neuropsychiatrist who performed
EEGs and QEEG "[b]rain map" in connection with mitigation case); Mansnerus, supra
note 176 (describing work of Dr. Jonathan Pincus, who uses "EEG's and brain scans" as
part of mitigation work on behalf of capital defendants).
182 See, e.g., Sapolsky, supra note 15, at 1788 ("Arguably, the most important arena in
which a greater knowledge of neuroscience is needed is the criminal justice system.").
183 For a fuller description of these biological correlates, see supra Part I.D.
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dants. In Roper, the Supreme Court entertained a challenge-under
the Eighth Amendment's injunction against cruel and unusual punish-
ment' 84-to a state law permitting the execution of juveniles who
were under the age of eighteen at the time they committed a capital
offense. Among the numerous amicus briefs submitted, 185 two in par-
ticular-one led by the American Psychological Association (APA) 186
and one led by the American Medical Association (AMA)187-cap-
tured the public's imagination. Both made novel use of
neuroimaging-based evidence to anchor their arguments that adoles-
cents were categorically less morally blameworthy than adults and, as
a result, not deserving of the ultimate criminal sanction of death. 188
According to the briefs, neuroimaging research suggests that ado-
lescents' behavioral immaturity is due, in large measure, to the "ana-
tomical immaturity of their brains."'18 9 The briefs cite structural and
functional neuroimaging studies showing that the neocortical regions
of the brain, which are believed to be responsible for risk assessment,
impulse control, and high-level cognition, are not yet fully developed
in adolescents. 190 Conversely, those subcortical areas of the brain
from which impulsivity and violence are thought to arise are fully
developed in adolescents and, indeed, are more active in teenagers
than in adults.191 Specifically, the AMA brief points to research
showing that the limbic system-the amygdala in particular-is over-
active in the brains of adolescents. 192 This part of the brain is associ-
184 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
185 See American Bar Association, Juvenile Death Penalty Amicus Briefs, http://www.
abanet.org/crimjust/uvjus/simmons/simmonsamicus (last visited July 28, 2007) (listing and
linking to amicus briefs filed on behalf of both Petitioner and Respondent in Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
186 APA Brief, supra note 159.
187 Brief for the American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) [hereinafter AMA Brief]. Cosigners included the
American Psychiatric Association, the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, the
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law, the National Association of Social Workers, the Missouri Chapter
of the National Association of Social Workers, and the National Mental Health
Association. Id. at 1.
188 Id. at 3-4; APA Brief, supra note 159, at 9. The briefs also pointed to other social
science evidence in support of their theses that adolescents are categorically less culpable
than adults. AMA Brief, supra note 187, at 4-9; APA Brief, supra note 159, at 4-9.
189 AMA Brief, supra note 187, at 10; accord APA Brief, supra note 159, at 9 (sug-
gesting "biological dimension to adolescent behavioral immaturity").
190 AMA Brief, supra note 187, at 11; APA Brief, supra note 159, at 10.
191 AMA Brief, supra note 187, at 11.
192 Id. at 15 & n.52 (citing Frontline: Inside the Teenage Brain (PBS television broadcast
Jan. 31, 2002) (interviewing Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, Director of Neuropsychology and
Cognitive Neuroimaging, McLean Hospital, Belmont, Mass.); K. Rubia et al., Functional
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ated with "primitive impulses of aggression, anger and fear."'1 93 At
the same time, the frontal lobes-and particularly the prefrontal
cortex-which are "the regions of the brain associated with impulse
control, risk assessment, and moral reasoning,"' 94 are still developing
in adolescents and are insufficiently mature to mediate and check the
influence of the limbic system.195
Both the AMA and APA amicus briefs also cite neuroimaging
studies showing that the adolescent prefrontal cortex has not yet com-
pleted two important processes necessary to its full function: myelina-
tion and pruning.196 "Myelination" is the process by which the axons
("neural fibers that use electrical impulses to carry information across
long distances") 197 are insulated, strengthening and reinforcing their
connections and "thereby greatly speeding up the communication
between cells, allowing the brain to process information more effi-
ciently and reliably."'198 "Pruning" is the process by which the volume
of the brain's gray matter (composed of neurons) is thinned, thus
strengthening the connections among the neurons that remain and
improving their function.1 99 Studies suggest that late in childhood
there is a new proliferation of gray matter in the prefrontal cortex,
which is then gradually pruned in a process that does not conclude
until after adolescence.200
The APA brief includes an extensive argument that the exclusion
of adolescents from capital punishment should be categorical because,
given adolescents' unfixed personal characteristics due in large part to
their still-developing brains, the mechanisms of capital sentencing are
not sufficient to assess their individual culpability.201 Capital jurors
Frontalisation with Age: Mapping Neurodevelopmental Trajectories with fMRI, 24
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 13 (2000)).
193 Id. at 11.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 16-20 (citing Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Devel-
opment During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 8174,
8174 (2004) (showing delayed development of frontal lobes)); APA Brief, supra note 159,
at 9-12; see also Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adoles-
cence: A Longitudinal Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861 (1999) (showing delayed
development of frontal lobes); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adoles-
cent Brain Maturation, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (1999) (same).
196 AMA Brief, supra note 187, at 17-20; APA Brief, supra note 159, at 10-11.
197 AMA Brief, supra note 187, at 17.
198 APA Brief, supra note 159, at 11; accord AMA Brief, supra note 187, at 17 ("The
presence of myelin makes communication between different parts of the brain faster and
more reliable.").
199 AMA Brief, supra note 187, at 18-19; APA Brief, supra note 159, at 10-11.
200 AMA Brief, supra note 187, at 19-20; APA Brief, supra note 159, at 10.
201 APA Brief, supra note 159, at 15-26. In addition to the AMA and APA amicus
briefs, a coalition of juvenile justice advocates submitted a brief signed by more than fifty
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are thus incapable of accurately weighing the relevant aggravating and
mitigating factors in the balancing process required by virtually every
jurisdiction that retains the death penalty.
The APA and AMA briefs appeared to have an impact on the
Court's consideration of Roper.202 At oral argument, sixteen of the
twenty questions asked of then-Solicitor General Seth Waxman
(arguing on behalf of the Government) concerned the scientific evi-
dence presented in the two briefs. 20 3 Moreover, in the opinion itself-
which affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's conclusion that
applying the death penalty to juveniles runs afoul of the Eighth
Amendment 204-the Court's reasoning seemed animated by argu-
ments raised in the briefs. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
observed:
Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults
demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classi-
fied among the worst offenders. First, as any parent knows and as
such organizations. Brief for the Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at app. A, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter
JLC Brief]. The brief included a petition entitled "Health Professionals' Call to Abolish
the Execution of Juvenile Offenders in the United States." Id. at app. C; see also Press
Release, Physicians for Human Rights, Former U.S. Surgeons General and More Than 400
Child Health Professionals Call for an End to the Juvenile Death Penalty (July 19, 2004),
available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/news-2004-07-19.html (describing
petition). The petition declared that:
Neuroscience provides physiological evidence of adolescents' under-developed
mental capacities. Established principles and cutting-edge neuroscientific
research together demonstrate that adolescent behavior is dominated by the
region of the brain associated with impulse control and aggression (the amyg-
dala). The prefrontal cortex, which controls such impulse and aggression, and
which permits anticipation of consequences, consideration of alternatives,
planning, setting long range goals, and organization of sequential behavior,
does not fully mature until well beyond age eighteen (possibly as late as age
twenty-three). Leading neuroscientists have observed, therefore, that it is
unfair and unreasonable to impose expectations of adult-level capacities on the
thinking and behavior of minors.
JLC Brief, supra, at app. C at C2. The petition was signed by over four hundred health
care professionals, including former Surgeons General C. Everett Koop (1981-89) and
Julius Richmond (1977-81). Id. at app. C at C5-C6. The petition was also signed by a
wide array of neuroscientists, neurologists, psychiatrists, and psychologists. See id. at app.
C at C4-C42 (listing seven "Selected Endorsers" and thirty "Endorsers" with expertise in
neuroscience and neuroimaging).
202 Aliya Haider, Roper v. Simmons: The Role of the Science Brief, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 369, 375 (2006). But see Morse, supra note 24, at 410 (noting that Roper majority did
not cite specifically to any neuroimaging studies relied on by amicus briefs).
203 Haider, supra note 202, at 375.
204 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded by a vote of 5-4 that: (1) there was a national
consensus against the juvenile death penalty, and (2) as a normative matter, the juvenile
death penalty was contrary to the evolving Eighth Amendment standards that mark the
progress of a maturing society. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561-67.
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the scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite
tend to confirm, "[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense
of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and
are more understandable among the young. These qualities often
result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions. 20 5
Justice Kennedy agreed with the briefs' arguments that, because
adolescents have a temporarily diminished capacity for sound deci-
sionmaking and personal restraint, sentencing them to death violates
the basic principles of retributive justice on which capital punishment
is grounded.20 6 Justice Kennedy reasoned that juveniles are less
blameworthy principally because their disposition to criminal violence
is due to "transient immaturity" rather than "irreparable corrup-
tion. '' 207 The risk that jurors might mistake the former (a mitigating
circumstance) for the latter (an aggravating circumstance) makes the
individualized sentencing required by the Eighth Amendment impos-
sible when the offender is a juvenile.
The neurobiological theory of violence set forth by the Roper
amici-with its focus on frontal lobe impairment-fairly represents
the capital mitigation arguments used by cognitive neuroscientists
generally. 20 8 Neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga has noted that those
who represent criminal defendants "are looking for that one pixel in
205 Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). The other two differ-
ences cited by Justice Kennedy were juveniles' vulnerability to negative influences and
peer pressure, and their unformed and transitory character. Id. at 569-70. Presumably,
the "scientific" studies referenced above include the neuroimaging studies cited by the
AMA and the APA in their briefs.
206 Id. at 571.
207 Id. at 573.
208 Many cognitive neuroscientists have focused on frontal lobe impairment. For
example, Raine has argued both in court and in the public square that his neuroimaging
research on violence and the brain (and frontal lobe dysfunction in particular) strongly
suggests that defendants exhibiting such disorders should not be executed. Motluk, supra
note 176, at 45 (interviewing Raine); Raine, supra note 176, at 29 ("Will we look back
aghast at the execution of seriously violent offenders? Will we view execution of prisoners
as we now view the burning of witches? I would like to think so ...."). More recently,
psychologist and law professor Richard Redding has argued that the insanity defense
should be modified to take account of the difficulty that those suffering from frontal lobe
disorders face in conforming their behavior to the relevant legal standards in spite of their
rational understanding of the antisocial nature of their actions. Richard E. Redding, The
Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-first Century,
56 AM. U. L. REv. 51, 53 (2006). Neurologist Jonathan Pincus and psychiatrist Dorothy
Otnow-Lewis-both iconic figures in the world of capital defense mitigation work-regu-
larly evaluate defendants for frontal lobe impairment. Malcolm Gladwell, Damaged: Why
Do Some People Turn into Violent Criminals? New Evidence Suggests That It May All Be
in the Brain, NEW YORKER, Feb. 24 & Mar. 3, 1997, at 132, 133. Legal practitioners have
also taken notice. A 2004 article in the Capital Defense Journal similarly argues that
"[f]rontal lobe dysfunction is ripe for consideration ...as strong mitigation evidence
during sentencing." Seiden, supra note 176, at 420.
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their client's brain scan that shows a malfunction in the normal
inhibitory networks," which would allow them to demand leniency on
the grounds that their client could not control his actions. 20 9 Capital
defense attorneys, encouraged by some successes, 210 now present evi-
dence of frontal lobe dysfunction as mitigation evidence during the
sentencing phase; a growing body of scholarly literature encourages
the use of such evidence. 211
How has the short-term aim of cognitive neuroscientists fared to
date? In terms of persuading courts to admit neuroimaging evidence,
it can be regarded as successful. Indeed, some courts have even held
that the failure to allow neuroimaging evidence to be introduced at
the sentencing phase of a trial constitutes reversible error.212 At least
one court has granted a defendant funds to conduct neuroimaging
during a capital trial.213 But this is not so surprising; as noted above,
courts can be very permissive when it comes to admitting evidence for
purposes of capital mitigation.2 14 By the metric of whether defen-
dants receive a life sentence or the death penalty, however, the project
has proven to not be as successful. There are many cases in which
209 Thompson, supra note 16, at 52-53. Thompson concludes that neuroscientists should
embrace such a role so that criminals might be punished "better." Id. at 53.
210 Redding has noted approvingly that neuroscientific research on frontal lobe dysfunc-
tion "is actually having an effect on real-life cases" as judges increasingly are willing to
fault defense attorneys for failure to present evidence of brain damage during the sen-
tencing phase. Mansnerus, supra note 176.
211 See, e.g., Richard E. Redding, Why It Is Essential To Teach About Mental Health
Issues in Criminal Law (And a Primer on How To Do It), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 407,
418 (2004) ("[E]vidence of frontal lobe dysfunction is now being introduced in criminal
cases vis-a-vis issues of criminal responsibility and mitigation."). Later, Redding notes that
mental health evidence is "ubiquitous" in capital cases and takes it as settled that capital
defendants have an especially high prevalence of mental (particularly neuropsychological)
disorders. Id. at 436; see also Redding, supra note 208, at 53 (arguing that insanity defense
should reflect modern neuroscience research showing that defendants with frontal lobe
dysfunction have difficulty conforming their behavior to societal expectations); Seiden,
supra note 176, at 396 (noting that "the strongest use for evidence of frontal lobe dysfunc-
tion is in the mitigation context" and predicting that more lawyers will present frontal lobe
dysfunction defenses as scientific evidence of effects of frontal lobe dysfunction grows);
Steven R. Kiersh, How To Use and Combat Experts in Federal Death Penalty Cases, 2
ASS'N TRIAL LAW. AM. ANN. CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 1793 (2000)
(exhorting capital defense attorneys that "[y]our mental impairment experts must be well
qualified and familiar with prevailing theory on such issues as frontal lobe brain dysfunc-
tion" because it "can usually be found and used as mitigation evidence").
212 E.g., Hoskins v. State, 735 So. 2d 202, 203, 209-10 (Fla. 1997) (remanding for limited
purpose of conducting PET scan); People v. Jones, 620 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657-58 (App. Div.
1994) (holding failure to permit neurological testing for defendant to show impaired
"ability to think quickly and flexibly" and "ability to perceive risk" to be reversible error),
affd, 654 N.E.2d 1209 (N.Y. 1995).
213 See Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980, 998-99 (Fla. 2001) (detailing lower court's
authorization of funding for MRI scan).
214 See supra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
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juries were presented with neuroimaging evidence and nevertheless
imposed or recommended a sentence of death.215
B. Long-Term Aim: The Overthrow of Retribution
Our penal system is highly counterproductive from a consequen-
tialist perspective . . . and yet it remains in place because retribu-
tivist principles have a powerful moral and political appeal. It is
possible, however, that neuroscience will change these moral intu-
itions by undermining the intuitive, libertarian conceptions of free
will upon which retributivism depends.
... At this time, the law deals firmly but mercifully with individuals
whose behavior is obviously the product of forces beyond their con-
trol. Some day, the law may treat all convicted criminals this way.
That is, humanely.216
- Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen
215 See, e.g., Jackson v. Calderon, No. CV 91-4249-R, 1997 WL 855516, at *1, *6 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 14, 1997) (EEG used to show results of chronic drug use, jury sentenced death);
People v. Smith, 107 P.3d 229, 233-34 (Cal. 2005) (PET showing defendant's "brain
damage" introduced by Monte Buchsbaum at sentencing, jury sentenced death); People v.
Gutierrez, 52 P.3d 572, 585, 589 (Cal. 2002) ("brain scans" presented at trial to show
lesions on defendant's frontal lobes, jury sentenced death); People v. Kraft, 5 P.3d 68, 81,
98 (Cal. 2000) (PET scan introduced at sentencing, jury sentenced death); People v. Holt,
937 P.2d 213, 226, 231 (Cal. 1997) (PET and EEG showing abnormalities in frontal and
temporal lobes as well as damage to cingulate gyrus region of brain presented at penalty
phase, jury sentenced death); Johnston v. State, 841 So. 2d 349, 353-55 (Fla. 2002) (expert
testimony based on MRI, EEG, and PET presented at sentencing showing that defendant's
"frontal lobe area had substantially less activity than was normal (below the first percen-
tile)," trial court followed jury recommendation of death sentence); Smithers v. State, 826
So. 2d 916, 921-22 (Fla. 2002) (expert testified at sentencing that "PET scan of [defen-
dant's] head was abnormal and was consistent with brain damage due to head trauma,"
trial judge accepted jury recommendation of death sentence); Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d
923, 929, 936 (Fla. 2000) (expert testimony based on MRI and PET scans presented to
show defendant's "dysfunctional limbic system in the lower half of the brain" and "struc-
tural injury on the top half of his brain," trial judge accepted jury recommendation of
death sentence); State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 65, 71 (N.J. 1999) (expert testimony
based on SPECT results presented at penalty phase describing "possible serious problem
with defendant's brain," court sentenced defendant to death following jury finding that
aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors); State v. Reid, No. M2003-00539-CCA-
R3-DD, 2005 WL 1315689, at *1, *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 27, 2005) (MRI and PET
used to show shrinkage to left temporal lobe, jury sentenced death); Ex parte Simpson, 136
S.W.3d 660, 661, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (experts testified regarding MRI and EEG
results, court sentenced death).
216 Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1783-84.
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But although it may seem dehumanizing to medicalize people into
being broken cars, it can still be vastly more humane than moral-
izing them into being sinners. 217
- Robert Sapolsky
The foregoing discussion identified and articulated what appears
to be a clearly defined project on the part of cognitive neuroscientists
to affect capital sentencing. That is, they hope to use neuroimaging
research on the roots of criminal violence to aid capital defendants in
mitigation claims. This aspiration is for the short term: it is aimed at
immediate, concrete, and practical interventions in the existing frame-
work of capital sentencing. But the cognitive neuroscientists who are
active in this area also have a longer-term, more theoretical aspiration
for criminal justice. They aim to work a radical conceptual revision of
criminal punishment itself; more specifically, they seek to use the
premises and tools of neuroscience-and neuroimaging in partic-
ular-to embarrass, undermine, and ultimately overthrow retributive
justice as a principle of punishment. Once retribution is discredited,
they contend, criminal law will be animated solely by its proper end:
namely, the purely forward-looking, consequentialist goal of avoiding
socially harmful behavior. This new approach, it is hoped, will usher
in a regime of "therapeutic justice, '2 18 wherein criminal defendants
will be treated more humanely.
The most comprehensive articulation and defense of this long-
term aspiration for criminal punishment reform was advanced in two
papers published in 2004-one by coauthors Joshua Greene and
Jonathan Cohen219 and the other by Robert Sapolsky. 220
Greene and Cohen argue that advances in cognitive neuros-
cience-enabled by neuroimaging-will ultimately demonstrate that
"ordinary conceptions of human action and responsibility" are false.
"[A]s a result, the legal principles we have devised to reflect these
conceptions may be flawed" and must be radically overhauled and
replaced with principles that are grounded in a neuroscientific view of
the truth about free will and human agency. 221 The primary focus of
217 Sapolsky, supra note 15, at 1794.
218 See Bufkin & Luttrell, supra note 20, at 186 (advocating "therapeutic justice"
approach for its "holistic treatment regimens that hold offenders to 'scientifically rational
and legally appropriate degree[s] of accountability"' (alteration in original) (quoting
Richard L. Nygaard, The Dawn of Therapeutic Justice, in THE SCIENCE, TREATMENT, AND
PREVENTION OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIORS 23-1, 23-12 (Diana H. Fishbein ed., 2000))).
219 Greene & Cohen, supra note 57. This paper and the others from the same sympo-
sium have since been published in a book entitled LAW AND THE BRAIN (Semir Zeki &
Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006).
220 Sapolsky, supra note 15.
221 Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1775.
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their critique is the principle of retributive justice-which, they assert,
"depends on an intuitive, libertarian notion of free will that is under-
mined by science. 222
In defense of this thesis, Greene and Cohen first reprise the
familiar dichotomy of consequentialism ("which emerges from the
classical utilitarian tradition") 223 and retribution as both the general
and distributive justifications for criminal punishment. They define
consequentialism as a doctrine that regards punishment as "merely an
instrument for promoting future social welfare" 224 and that seeks to
prevent "future crime through the deterrent effect of the law and the
containment of dangerous individuals. '225 By contrast, they define
retribution as advocating the principle that "in the absence of miti-
gating circumstances, people who engage in criminal behaviour
deserve to be punished. '226
Greene and Cohen then turn to the ancient (yet ongoing) debate
over the nature and intelligibility of free will. They articulate a tripar-
tite typology of positions on the issue: hard determinism, libertari-
anism, and compatibilism.227 Hard determinism, as the name implies,
rejects the concept of free will. It holds that free will is fundamentally
incompatible with the premise that all human action can be suffi-
ciently explained by material causes that are necessarily bound by the
laws of physics and previous events ("past states of the world"). 228
Libertarianism (as characterized by Greene and Cohen) accepts the
claim that free will and determinism are incompatible but nevertheless
concludes that the world is not, in fact, completely determined by the
laws governing the motion and rest of matter.229 In contrast, compa-
tibilism holds that material determinism and free will are reconcil-
able,230 though compatibilism's conception of free will is more
metaphysically modest than that of libertarianism.
Greene and Cohen argue that insofar as advances in neuroscience
have begun to reveal the purely material causes of human thought and
choice, they have also begun to undermine the fundamental tenets of
libertarianism and thus retributive punishment. Libertarianism sup-
222 Id. at 1776.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 1775.
225 Id. at 1776.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 1777.
228 Id. Greene and Cohen credit this particular formulation of determinism to Peter van
Inwagen. Id. at 1777, 1785 (citing Peter van Inwagen, The Incompatibility of Free Will and
Determinism, in FREE WILL 46 (Gary Watson ed., 1982).
229 Id. at 1777.
230 Id.
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plies the strong conception of free will (and thus moral responsibility)
on which the doctrine of retribution relies. Greene and Cohen argue,
however, that the strength of the concept of free will posited by liber-
tarianism arises from its claim to operate through a nonmaterial
mechanism-a proposition increasingly at odds with modern sci-
ence. 231 They contend that ultimately neuroimaging will entirely
undermine the antimaterialist foundations of the libertarian position
on free will, thus removing the grounding necessary for just deserts.232
Moreover, it is evident that retributive justice is conceptually irrecon-
cilable with hard determinism: if all actions are sufficiently deter-
mined by material causes beyond anyone's control, the notions of
culpability and just deserts upon on which retribution depends are
unintelligible.
Greene and Cohen additionally assert that compatibilism's
modest account of free will is not sufficiently robust to support the
exacting demands of retribution, either as a general aim or as a dis-
tributive principle. 233 They describe a compatibilist vision of free will,
one that defines free will as the minimal capacity for rational action-
namely, the ability to produce "behaviour that serves [one's] desires
in light of [his] beliefs. '234 As they describe, Stephen Morse has elo-
quently and forcefully argued that the law is constructed with this
minimalist conception of free will in mind.235 Law, Morse maintains,
is compatibilist and thus is not threatened by any proof of deter-
minism that neuroimaging may eventually offer.236 In support of his
claim, Morse points to the criminal law, which refuses to excuse from
guilt those defendants who are laboring under a defect of mind, so
long as they satisfy a minimal cognitive and volitional threshold.237
Greene and Cohen respond that while the law may formally focus on
the question of minimal rationality, what people in society really care
about is whether the defendant is responsible in a richer sense-one
rooted in libertarian conceptions of free will.238 That is, even if the
defendant is shown to be minimally rational in a legal sense, citizens
will still ask whether it was "really him" who committed the crime, or
whether it was "his upbringing," "his genes," "his circumstances," or
"his brain" that were truly responsible. 239 These questions, Greene
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 1783.
234 Id. at 1778.
235 Id.; see also Morse, supra note 69, at 170.
236 Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1778; Morse, supra note 69, at 162-81.
237 Morse, supra note 69, at 180-81; accord Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1778.
238 Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1778-80.
239 Id. at 1778-79.
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and Cohen argue, arise from a libertarian vision of free will that does
not accept the materialist determinism of Morse's compatabilism but
rather is animated by a dualist premise that the brain and the mind are
distinct (though interacting) entities.240 Thus, while the law as written
may be (as Morse contends) formally compatabilist, it is actually
driven by the "libertarian moral intuitions" of the citizens who imple-
ment it.2 41
Greene and Cohen characterize this tension between the law's
formal requirements and society's richer conception of free will as an
unstable "marriage of convenience. ' 242  They predict that
neuroimaging will force a crisis in this union: cognitive neuroscience
(aided by neuroimaging) will ultimately show that there is no differ-
ence between "him" and "his brain, '243 thus proving that the founda-
tions of the libertarian dualist intuitions about human agency are
untenable. This forms the basis for their belief that Morse underesti-
mates the transformative power of neuroimaging on the law and espe-
cially on criminal punishment.
It is far beyond the scope of this Article to try to resolve this rich
and vexed dispute about the future impact of neuroimaging on the law
as a whole. Nevertheless, it is necessary to briefly reflect on how this
debate plays out in the context of capital sentencing. Morse is cer-
tainly correct that the legal standard for diminished capacity for the
purpose of determining legal guilt is modest; defendants rightly can be
characterized as needing only "minimal rationality" in order to be
held fully accountable for their actions. This is borne out by the small
percentage of cases in which defendants raise the defense of legal
insanity and the even smaller portion of cases in which such a defense
succeeds.2 44 But in the context of capital sentencing, which is
animated by a particularly rich and textured conception of moral
responsibility, Greene and Cohen's analysis is especially accurate.
The Supreme Court has construed the Constitution to require the con-
sideration of all mitigating factors relevant to a criminal defendant's
culpability in meting out capital punishment. 245 The very doctrine of
mitigation is driven by questions like those that Greene and Cohen
240 Id. at 1779.
241 Id. at 1778.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1780-81.
244 See An Overview of the Impact of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Law, supra
note 125 ("That said, the insanity defense is rarely invoked, and is even more rarely
successful.").
245 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) ("To meet constitutional require-
ments, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating
factors.").
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argue society "really" cares about, such as "[w]as it him," or was it
"his brain," "his upbringing," or his "circumstances? ' 246 Morse is
right that these questions do not currently bear on legal guilt, but they
do bear significantly on the kind of punishment imposed on the legally
guilty. So it would seem that capital sentencing is largely driven by a
metaphysically ambitious conception of human agency-one that is at
odds with the conception that animates our determinations of guilt
and innocence.
According to Greene and Cohen, only libertarian incompatibi-
lism can provide adequate support to the principle of retributive jus-
tice. But they predict (and indeed, hope) that cognitive neuroscience
will shatter this foundation. They note that while philosophical argu-
ments against free will have not proven persuasive to the general pop-
ulation, science supported by neuroimaging will succeed where
philosophy has failed:
Arguments are nice, but physical demonstrations are far more com-
pelling. What nruroscience does, and will continue to do at an
accelerated pace, is elucidate the 'when', 'where' and 'how' of the
mechanical processes that cause behavior. It is one thing to deny
that human decision-making is purely mechanical when your oppo-
nent offers only a general, philosophical argument. It is quite
another to hold your ground when your opponent can make
detailed predictions about how these mechanical processes work,
complete with images of the brain structures involved and equations
that describe their function. 247
Greene and Cohen argue that when and if the notion of human
agency is shown to be illusory, societal attitudes may well change. 24
8
Eventually the law of punishment will have to follow suit and reflect
the newly revealed truths about free will. In other words, once society
internalizes the lessons of cognitive neuroscience as they bear on
moral (and thus criminal) responsibility, retribution-relying as it
does on a false understanding of human agency-will be eliminated as
a legitimate general or distributive justification for punishment.249
Greene and Cohen consider the end of retributive justice salutary
and desirable. They assert that retributivism is largely responsible for
the "counter-productive" state of the American penal system 25° and
advance consequentialism as the sole legitimate justification for pun-
246 Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1778-79.
247 Id. at 1781.
248 Id. at 1783.
249 Id.
250 Id.
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ishment.251 Without free will-and hence, without retribution-pun-
ishment can be fashioned solely with the future benefits to society in
mind. Criminal offenders can still be held "responsible" for their
actions, but without the moral stigma and judgment that retributive
justice implies. 252 Sentencing can promote beneficial effects for
society by deterring future harms and incapacitating only those who
would visit such harms upon the polity. 253 Greene and Cohen's
aspirational framework preserves excuse defenses (such as insanity
and duress) for those cases where it can be shown that the deterrence
of such offenders would not be effective. 254 But retribution would be
laid to rest forever as a pernicious fiction.255
Greene and Cohen conclude by summarizing their aspirations for
criminal punishment in the following way:
Free will as we ordinarily understand it is an illusion generated by
our cognitive architecture.... At this time, the law deals firmly but
mercifully with individuals whose behaviour is obviously the
product of forces that are ultimately beyond their control. Some
day, the law may treat all convicted criminals this way. That is,
humanely.256
Greene and Cohen are not alone in their criticisms of retributive
justice. Robert Sapolsky notes that "at a logical extreme, a neurobio-
logical framework may indeed eliminate blame," but adds that the
institution of criminal punishment is still necessary for the purpose of
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 See id. ("[C]onsequentialists . . . can hold people responsible for crimes simply
because doing so has, on balance, beneficial effects through deterrence, containment,
etc.").
254 Id.
255 Id. Greene and Cohen do not believe merely that the overthrow of retribution by
cognitive neuroscience will yield a better functioning system of criminal justice; they
believe that it will make society more humane for criminal defendants. Id. at 1784. Elimi-
nating the moral stigma of retributive justice and embracing the hard determinist account
of human agency will lead society to realize that the criminal does not deserve punishment
and thus is not rightly the object of hatred and resentment. Greene and Cohen acknowl-
edge the difficulty that people might have in letting go of their deeply rooted beliefs in free
will. See id. at 1781-83 (suggesting that non-existence of free will contradicts millenia-old
patterns of human thinking). Indeed, they are not sanguine about the possibility that this
will be feasible in all areas of life. See id. at 1781 (observing that narcissistic beliefs, such as
uniqueness of humans, repeatedly have succumbed to new, more accurate scientific under-
standings). In response to this worry, they argue that for the most important matters (such
as capital sentencing), we should act bravely in accord with those truths that we know
about human agency, discarding principles of retributive justice and taking our bearings
solely from consequentialist considerations about society's future well-being. See id. at
1784 (discussing need to reject free will within criminal system).
256 Id. at 1784.
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protecting society from future harms. 257 Sapolsky echoes (in a
fashion) Greene and Cohen: "To understand is not to forgive or to do
nothing; whereas you do not ponder whether to forgive a car that,
because of problems with its brakes, has injured someone, you never-
theless protect society from it. ' ' 258 Sapolsky shares Greene and
Cohen's desire to shed a framework that implicitly regards criminal
defendants as morally blameworthy, preferring a consequentialist
system even though it adopts an arguably diminished understanding of
human personhood. 259
Practitioners of neuroimaging whose work contributes directly or
indirectly to the short-term project of aiding capital defendants with
mitigation claims have also embraced these long-term aspirations.260
For example, some have argued that retributive justice (grounded in
"the assumption that human will or choice ultimately governs
behavior") 261 accounts for factors "with no inherent explanatory
worth" that "are summoned to justify less-than-stellar community-
level interventions and unproductive institutionalization. ' 262 Such
practitioners believe that the new findings of cognitive neuroscience
should steer society away from retribution and towards a regime of
"therapeutic justice" in which offenders will be held to "scientifically
rational and legally appropriate degree[s] of accountability. '263 They
also believe that neuroimaging research will ultimately lead to the
refinement and improvement of the instruments used for the classifi-
cation and prediction of violent criminal behavior. 264
257 Sapolsky, supra note 15, at 1794.
258 Id.
259 See id. ("But although it may seem dehumanizing to medicalize people into being
broken cars, it can still be vastly more humane than moralizing them into being sinners.").
260 Vickie Luttrell (a psychologist with neuroscience training) and Jana Bufkin (a crimi-
nologist) reached conclusions similar to those of Cohen, Greene, and Sapolsky following
their 2005 review of seventeen neuroimaging studies of criminal violence. Bufkin &
Luttrell, supra note 20, at 187-88. Bufkin and Luttrell argue that these studies shed impor-
tant light on the neuroanatomical origins of criminal violence. Id. at 185-86. They agree
with the Greene-Cohen-Sapolsky thesis that the criminal justice system should take its
bearings from these findings rather than from "legal variables" relating to just deserts. Id.
at 186.
261 Id. at 186.
262 Id.
263 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
264 Id. at 187. Other neuroscientists, many of whom have testified on behalf of capital
defendants at sentencing, have evinced sympathy and agreement with the Greene-Cohen-
Sapolsky thesis. Buchsbaum-arguably the founding father of neuroimaging in capital
mitigation-echoed this theme in his presentation at a recent conference, quoting Bertrand
Russell:
A man infected with cholera is not allowed to mix freely with the population,
but we do not think him wicked. We may similarly be obliged to interfere with
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In short, it is clear that, alongside their narrow, short-term goal of
intervening as experts for capital defendants for purposes of mitiga-
tion at sentencing, cognitive neuroscientists in this field have a far
more ambitious goal for the institution of capital punishment: to use
the claims of their discipline and the new powers conferred by
neuroimaging to overthrow retributive justice as a legitimate justifica-
tion for criminal sanctions.
This long-term goal is very much in the spirit of late-eighteenth-
century thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and Cesare, Marquis of
Beccaria, who regarded punishment of the guilty as justified only
insofar as it was instrumental to the protection of society and pro-
moting human happiness. 265 As George Fletcher observed, under
their utilitarian approach, "No form of punishment could be justified
unless it was the cheapest available means for serving these social
ends." 266
The long-term aim also mirrors, in many respects, the work of
Barbara Wootton, Baroness of Abinger. Lady Wootton, a twentieth-
century criminologist, rejected the notion of criminal "punishment"
altogether, arguing instead that the only intelligible goal for the crim-
inal law is to be a "system of purely forward-looking social hygiene in
the freedom of a murderer, but we should not have a feeling of moral reproba-
tion in the one case more than in the other.
Buchsbaum, supra note 178, at 56. Similarly, Raine has said that his neuroimaging
research on criminal violence has led him to conclude that the evolutionary mechanism of
retribution is no longer useful and that abandonment of this principle of punishment will
lead to the understanding and forgiveness of certain violent offenders. Raine, supra note
176, at 28. He argues that retribution is merely a quasi-religious sensibility that satisfies
our urge to "blame someone." Id. at 28-29. He predicts (and hopes) that cognitive
neuroscience will enlighten society such that it will eventually view the execution of pris-
oners as it now views the burning of witches. Id. at 29.
Psychiatrist and mitigation expert Daniel Amen seems to agree that the moral frame-
work on which retribution is erected is called into question by advances in neuroimaging,
explaining that "I used to have this set idea that there was right and wrong, heaven and hell
and purgatory. The whole thing was pretty clear to me until I started looking at these brain
scans. Then I thought to myself, 'Uh-oh, maybe there's more to it."' Lasden, supra note
136, at 29 (quoting Amen). Rita Carter adds that "[i]f acts of 'mindless' violence really are
that-no more conscious than the kick of a leg when the knee is tapped-it seems point-
less, as well as unfair, to punish the perpetrators." RITA CARTER, MAPPING THE MIND 92
(1998). Patricia Churchland likewise argues that neuroscience renders retributive justice
unintelligible, and that the right aim of punishment is to prevent social harms: "My
hypothesis is that holding people responsible and punishing the guilty is rooted not in some
abstract relationship between a Platonic conception of justice and contra-causal willing, but
in the fundamental social need for civil behavior." Churchland, supra note 35, at 10
(emphasis added).
265 See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469,
502-03 (1976) (describing criminological goals of Bentham and Beccaria).
266 Id. at 502. Their arguments provided the conceptual background to what Fletcher
calls "protectionist criminology." Id. at 503.
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which our only concern when we have an offender to deal with is with
the future and the rational aim of prevention of further crime. 267
This view led Wootton to argue for a complete abandonment of mens
rea as an element of guilt in favor of a system of strict criminal lia-
bility.268 She believed that a person's intentions at the time of a crime
are not knowable and, indeed, not relevant to the question of guilt. A
defendant's mental state, to Wootton, would only be relevant as a pre-
dictive instrument to be used in preventing the same defendant from
offending in the future.269 Under her approach, the state would take
custody of an offender upon his conviction for a criminal act and give
him medical treatment or incarcerate him. 270 Wootton's approach
blurs the distinction between prisons and hospitals: Both are "places
of safety" where "offenders will receive the treatment which experi-
ence suggest [sic] is most likely to evoke the desired response" of
preventing future crime.271 Wootton's framework thus explicitly and
intentionally conflates punishment with therapy.272
It is worth noting that while Greene and Cohen fundamentally
share with Wootton the same view of the aims of criminal law, they
have opposite views on whether the reasons for antisocial choices can
be known. Wootton regards such reasons as unknowable, whereas
Greene and Cohen are confident that someday they will become dis-
cernible through neuroimaging. 273
In sum, the cognitive neuroscience aspiration for capital sen-
tencing consists of two dimensions: a short-term aim to aid capital
267 H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 74 YALE L.J. 1325, 1328 (1965) (reviewing BARBARA
WoorrON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1963)).
268 Id. at 1327-28.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 1327.
271 Id. at 1327-28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
272 Wootton's aspirational system of criminal law seems to closely resemble Bufkin and
Luttrell's vision of "therapeutic justice," Raine's description of crime as a disease, and
Sapolsky's metaphor of the criminal defendant as a broken automobile. See Bufkin &
Luttrell, supra note 20, at 186-87 (describing model of therapeutic justice); Raine, supra
note 176, at 29 (hoping that two hundred years from now we will view serious criminal
behavior as clinical disorder); Sapolsky, supra note 15, at 1794 ("But although it may seem
dehumanizing to medicalize people into being broken cars, it can still be vastly more
humane than moralizing them into being sinners."). Wootton's conviction that the sole
purpose of the criminal law is the prevention of socially harmful behavior is shared explic-
itly by Greene and Cohen. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1775 (arguing that,
under adopted consequentialist view, punishment is "merely an instrument for promoting
future social welfare").
273 Greene and Cohen predict that someday in the future, neuroscientists will be able to
watch the decisionmaking process in real time using functional neuroimaging. See Greene
& Cohen, supra note 57, at 1781 (describing hypothetical future scenario in which
neuroimaging facilitates direct, real-time observation of neural processes underlying
human subject's choice between soup and salad).
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defendants in a practical way in their mitigation claims, and a longer-
term, more radical aspiration to eliminate retributive justice as a dis-
tributive principle of punishment.
III
A CRITIQUE OF THE ASPIRATIONS OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE:
THE COMPLEXITY OF PUNISHMENT
Little Bill Daggett: I don't deserve this. To die like this. I was
building a house.
William Munny: Deserve's got nothin' to do with it. [Aims at Dag-
gett and fires. ]274
There are many ways that one might approach the assessment of
the comprehensive aspirations of cognitive neuroscientists for capital
sentencing. As noted at the outset, this Article seeks to provide a
friendly critique; that is, the analysis proceeds from a position of sym-
pathy and solidarity with the humanitarian impulses-and with the
general antipathy for the death penalty-that animate the cognitive
neuroscientists working in this field. Thus, the wisdom and soundness
of the cognitive neuroscience project is being appraised according to
the metric of its own humanitarian ambitions: namely, success in
helping convicted capital defendants persuade jurors and judges not to
impose a sentence of death, thereby creating a more compassionate
and humane legal regime for such defendants. Unfortunately, it
seems unlikely that these ends would be achieved if the short- and
long-term aims of cognitive neuroscientists described in Part II were
ever actually realized. To the contrary, it seems likely that the crim-
inal regime desired by cognitive neuroscientists would, tragically and
ironically, prove far harsher and less humane for capital defendants
than the current system.
Why? Simply put, the project, taken as a whole, is utterly at war
with itself. Its short-term aim relies on a particular theory of mitiga-
tion that is firmly grounded in retribution-a principle whose founda-
tions are explicitly rejected by the architects of the cognitive
neuroscience project. Conversely, the project's long-term aim is
devoted to dismantling the doctrinal foundation (i.e., retribution)
upon which the short-term aspiration depends. Thus, the success of its
long-term goal would necessarily defeat the project's short-term goal.
Worse still, the extant mechanisms that the long-term project would
explicitly leave in place (that is, those features of the capital sen-
tencing framework animated solely by the consequentialist goal of
274 UNFORGIVEN (Warner Bros. 1992).
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avoiding societal harms) constitute arguably the single gravest threat
to a capital defendant's life. If the capital sentencing regime were
remade according to the aspirations of the long-term plan, this threat
would be dramatically amplified precisely because of the research of
cognitive neuroscientists. Indeed, as I will argue below, it is only by
virtue of the doctrine of just deserts that neuroimaging evidence of the
roots of criminal violence can be understood as reducing a capital
defendant's culpability. This conclusion accords with the (perhaps
counterintuitive) fact that just deserts has served as arguably the most
valuable limiting principle in the American jurisprudence of capital
sentencing, and even perhaps the criminal law more broadly.
A. The Short-Term Aspiration: Mitigation and Just Deserts
As discussed extensively above, the formal context in which cog-
nitive neuroscientists seek to implement their short-term aim is at the
mitigation phase of capital sentencing.275 Mitigation involves the
presentation of evidence regarding the character, background, or
other pertinent features of an already convicted defendant that might
convince the jury that the defendant's degree of culpability merits life
imprisonment rather than death.276 However, defendants who reach
the sentencing phase have, by necessity, already satisfied the prerequi-
site legal thresholds for sanity, competence, and the capacity to for-
mulate the relevant mens rea. At this stage of the criminal process,
therefore, "it is impossible to offer an 'excuse' for the defendant's
acts. The jury already knows that no justifiable excuse exists for what
the defendant did. '277 Mitigation evidence is presented in order to
"inspire[ ] compassion ... offer[ing] neither justification, nor excuse
for the capital crime. ' 278 A mitigation claim is thus a plea for leniency
in spite of a prior finding of legal guilt.
There are many ways in which capital defendants and the experts
working on their behalf seek to move jurors towards leniency.279 One
of the most frequent strategies is to introduce evidence that the defen-
dant was laboring under a mental disturbance or incapacity that, while
275 See supra Part II.A.
276 John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic Psychologist,
27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 78 (2003).
277 Peter T. Hansen, Mitigation: An Outline of Law, Method and Strategy, CAP. DEF.
DIG., Apr. 1992, at 29, 32.
278 Fabian, supra note 276, at 78 (quoting Russell Stetler, Mental Disabilities and Mitiga-
tion, CHAMPION, Apr. 1999, at 49, 50).
279 For an illuminating typology of mitigating evidence, see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, A
Tear in the Eye of the Law: Mitigating Factors and the Progression Toward a Disease
Theory of Criminal Justice, 83 OR. L. REV. 631, 656-87 (2004). For an illustrative statutory
example of admissible mitigating evidence, see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (2004).
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not an excuse for purposes of guilt, should nevertheless reduce his
culpability. 2 0 As discussed in Part II, this is the approach dictated by
the short-term aspiration.
This strategy, however, is squarely rooted in a distributive theory
of punishment that proponents of the cognitive neuroscience project
explicitly repudiate as a principal source of the irrationality and bru-
tality that plague the current system. Paul Robinson has called this
theory "punishment according to desert," as it is an approach that dis-
tributes punishment "according to the offender's personal blamewor-
thiness for the past offense, which takes account not only of the
seriousness of the offense, but also the full range of culpability,
capacity, and situational factors that we understand to affect an
offender's blameworthiness.1 281 The Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence confirms that the concept of mitigation grows directly
out of the requirements of retributive justice:
Underlying [the Supreme Court precedents bearing on the doctrine
of mitigation] is the principle that punishment should be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant. If the
sentencer is to make an individualized assessment of the appropri-
ateness of the death penalty, "evidence about the defendant's back-
ground and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by
this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are
attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and
mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have
no such excuse. '282
Additionally, the AMA's amicus brief in Roper powerfully illustrates
that the short-term aspiration is driven entirely by an appeal to the
280 See Gladwell, supra note 208, at 146 (discussing role neurology and psychiatry
should play in debate over competency and responsibility).
281 Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.L 's Proposed Distributive Principle of "Limiting Retribu-
tivism": Does It Mean in Practice Anything Other than Pure Desert?, 7 BuFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 3, 5 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson, Limiting Retributivism]. In a recent paper,
Robinson offered a comprehensive typology of "desert." Paul H. Robinson, Competing
Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical 5, 7-8 (Univ. of Pa.
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-32,
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=924917 (distinguishing "Vengeful
Desert," which exacts same measure of suffering from defendant as that which he caused
victim, from "Deontological Desert," which judges blameworthiness according to abstract
notions of good and evil, and "Empirical Desert," which focuses on blameworthiness as
defined by shared intuitions of justice in relevant community).
282 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S.
538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)), overruled in part by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002).
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culpability-mitigating effects of the defendant's neurological
condition. 83
It is clear that Justice Kennedy's opinion in Roper was likewise
principally animated by concerns about just deserts: "Retribution is
not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on one
whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial
degree, by reason of youth and immaturity. ' 284 Kennedy also
observed that, given their diminished capacity for self-control and risk
assessment, it was "unclear" whether the death penalty would have a
sufficient deterrent effect on potential juvenile offenders. 285 In this
way, Justice Kennedy's doubts about deterrence (the second principle
justifying the death penalty as punishment) further bolstered his more
emphatic arguments that retributive justice categorically requires
sparing adolescents from the ultimate punishment.286
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion likewise echoed the argu-
ments made in the AMA and APA briefs about the inadequacy of
individualized capital sentencing as a safeguard against error and
abuse in the capital context. Indeed, Kennedy went further, holding
that juries would be incapable of treating youth as a mitigating factor
on a case-by-case basis:
An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded
nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating argu-
ments based on youth as a matter of course.... In some cases a
defendant's youth may even be counted against him. In this very
case . . . the prosecutor argued Simmons' youth was aggravating
rather than mitigating. 287
Cognitive neuroscientists who invoke neuroimaging evidence for
purposes of capital mitigation embrace the strategy outlined in the
AMA brief and adopted in Justice Kennedy's opinion. The short-
term aspiration is advanced by the claim that the defendant "is a
283 One of the authors of that brief, Aliya Haider, recently acknowledged that its prin-
cipal strategy was to seek refuge within the doctrine of retribution:
The science brief argued that retribution would not be served by executing
adolescents. In death penalty jurisprudence, culpability is the measure of retri-
bution. The Court is committed to meting out punishments that are propor-
tionate to the offender's culpability. Thus, in our science brief, we argued that
juveniles' brains are anatomically different and deficient as compared to those
of adults.
Haider, supra note 202, at 371 (footnotes omitted).
284 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
285 Id. at 571-72.
286 Justice Kennedy did not mention the specific deterrent effect of the death penalty in
this context. It is, of course, beyond dispute that executing a capital defendant perma-
nently deters future crimes by that individual.
287 Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
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human being with redeeming value, and that he or she suf-
fered... neurological... damage.., that make[s] him or her less than
100 percent morally culpable for his or her behavior. ' 288 But this
approach trades on the very dichotomy of "him" versus "his brain"
that just deserts invites-one that proponents of the long-term aspira-
tion deplore as unintelligible. 289 Thus, the short-term aspiration
depends on precisely the principle of punishment that the long-term
approach rules out of bounds.
B. The Long-Term Aspiration: Prediction and Prevention
Conversely, the long-term aspiration seeks to undermine and
destroy the very distributive principle of retributive justice upon
which the short-term counterpart depends. As discussed in Part 1I,
proponents of the long-term goal regard just deserts as anathema to
the only suitable goal of the criminal law-preventing future criminal
harms. The long-term aspiration would thus preclude the introduction
of mitigation evidence that bears on diminished culpability. It would
leave in place only those mechanisms that promote the avoidance of
crime. The mechanisms of capital sentencing best suited to this end
are those that are calibrated to predict the social harms to be con-
tained or avoided. As John Monahan has observed, "Assessing the
likelihood of future crime .. is a central task of sentencing under the
forward-looking principle of crime control. ' 290 By contrast, such con-
siderations are "jurisprudentially irrelevant to sentencing under the
backward-looking principle of punishment [according to] just
deserts."'291 Nothing in capital sentencing embodies the purely conse-
quentialist spirit of the long-term cognitive neuroscience project as
much as the aggravating factor of future dangerousness. To fully
appreciate the impact that the long-term plan would like to have on
capital sentencing, it is thus necessary to explore briefly the nature
and contours of this element of death penalty jurisprudence.
"Future dangerousness" is a commonly invoked aggravating
factor in capital sentencing.292 Prosecutors seeking the death penalty
288 Michael N. Burt, Forensics as Mitigation, http://www.goextranet.net/Seminars/
Dallas/BurtForensics.htm (last visited July 28, 2007).
289 See supra Part II.B.
290 Monahan, supra note 157, at 396.
291 Id.
292 Twenty-one of the thirty-eight states with the death penalty include future danger-
ousness as an aggravating factor. Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Danger-
ousness in Capital Sentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious
Decision-Making, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 64 (2005). While only six states place
primary emphasis on this factor by statute, these states account for a majority of the execu-
tions in the United States since the Supreme Court ended the Furman-era moratorium on
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bear the burden of persuading jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that
at least one aggravating factor exists to make the defendant death-
eligible. 293 As one capital defense expert puts it, this is the stage of
the trial where the government "suggest[s] to the jury that the defen-
dant is a living hazard to civilization and a menacing threat to
society. '294 To this end, prosecutors often submit the testimony of
experts or laypersons regarding a defendant's future dangerousness or
simply argue it themselves based on a variety of evidence. 295 In those
jurisdictions that prohibit the state from submitting an expert predic-
tion of violence, prosecutors often try to establish future dangerous-
ness through cross-examination of the defense's mitigation experts.296
Sometimes, as in Roper,297 prosecutors will try to turn the defendant's
own mitigation claims against him, arguing that evidence of a violent
disposition borne of abuse or a personality disorder is, in fact, demon-
strative of future dangerousness. 298 The Supreme Court affirmed the
the death penalty, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam), with its
decisions in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
277 (1976). Dorland & Krauss, supra, at 64, 66. For an illustrative sample of state statu-
tory language, see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox
of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
Rrs. J. 345, 415 n.373 (1998).
293 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that in capital sentencing schemes
where jury sits as trier of fact, facts underlying any statutory aggravating factors must be
determined beyond reasonable doubt by jury rather than by judge). It is important to bear
in mind that most, if not all, jurisdictions designate additional aggravating factors beyond
"future dangerousness." See Simon & Spaulding, supra note 170, at app. 4A at 102-07
(listing aggravating factors by jurisdiction).
294 Hansen, supra note 277, at 32.
295 See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Pre-
dicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1849 (2003)
(listing ways that future dangerousness may be introduced); Dorland & Krauss, supra note
292, at 64-65 (same). For a discussion of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues associated
with state expert examinations of capital defendants for purposes of future dangerousness,
see generally Welsh S. White, Government Psychiatric Examinations and the Death Penalty,
37 ARiz. L. REV. 869 (1995).
296 See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 295, at 1849-50 (noting problem of
"opening the door" to arguments about future dangerousness).
297 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 558 (2005) (noting prosecutor's attempt to use
potential mitigating factor of young age against defendant).
298 See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit's "Double-Edged
Sword": Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the Right to
the Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1480, 1502 (1999) (discussing potential for
prejudice when "evidence that seems intuitively mitigating may be, in the minds of some
jurors, actually aggravating"); Robert F. Schopp, Two-Edged Swords, Dangerousness, and
Expert Testimony in Capital Sentencing, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 58 n.7 (2006) (noting
that prosecutor in Roper characterized defendant's young age as "scary"). For an excellent
overview of the issues in this area, see Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 295, at
1849-50, 1857. For cites to several critical commentaries, see Dorland & Krauss, supra
note 292, at 66-67 nn.16-18. For additional discussion of these issues, see also Monahan,
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constitutionality of future dangerousness as an aggravating factor in
capital sentencing thirty years ago in Jurek v. Texas. 299 Seven years
later, in Barefoot v. Estelle, the Court held that the state's use of the
expert testimony of two psychiatrists to prove future dangerousness
was constitutional, even though the experts' opinions were based on
hypothetical questions rather than personal examinations of the
defendant. 300 Moreover, the Court reached its conclusion over the
vigorous objections of the American Psychiatric Association, who
argued in an amicus brief that such predictions were fatally
unreliable .301
There are two principal scientific approaches to assessing future
dangerousness. The first is clinical prediction, which relies on the
judgment of experts (such as psychologists and psychiatrists) or
laypersons (such as police or probation officers) to evaluate the defen-
dant as an individual. The second is actuarial (or statistical) predic-
tion, which evaluates defendants according to "explicit rules
specifying which risk factors are to be measured, how those risk fac-
tors are to be scored, and how the scores are to be mathematically
combined to yield an objective estimate of violence risk. '302 Among
experts in the field, actuarial methods are thought to be significantly
more reliable than clinical methods, 30 3 though there are commenta-
tors who argue that all predictive efforts are insufficiently reliable to
be permitted in capital sentencing. 3°4
supra note 157, at 427-28, and Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness,
98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 48-58 (2003).
299 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976).
300 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983).
301 See id. at 899 (stating that adversarial system is "competent to uncover, recognize,
and take due account" of shortcomings of such evidence); see also Brief Amicus Curiae for
the American Psychiatric Ass'n, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
302 Monahan, supra note 157, at 405-06; see also id. at 409-13 (describing three most
prominent actuarial instruments for risk assessment: Violence Risk Appraisal Guide
(VRAG); Historical, Clinical or Risk-Management Variables (HCR-20), and Classification
of Violent Risk (COVR)); id. at 408 n.71 (referencing PCL-R).
303 Id. at 408.
304 E.g., Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Psychiatric Evidence on Trial, 56 SMU L. REV. 2191,
2232 (2003) (arguing that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness should be excluded for
"majority" of capital defendants who are not mentally ill because such predictions do not
meet tests of relevance and reliability); Dorland & Krauss, supra note 292, at 66 (citing
"strong evidence" that "dangerousness predictions are inaccurate, unreliable, and inordi-
nately prejudicial" and therefore are arbitrary and capricious). But see Beecher-Monas &
Garcia-Rill, supra note 295, at 1897-1900 (arguing that actuarial instruments provide "best
information available" and should be given to jurors in capital sentencing proceedings);
Monahan, supra note 157, at 427-34 (arguing that under certain prescribed circumstances,
actuarial risk assessment is appropriate tool in both criminal and civil-commitment
settings).
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Because the rules of evidence that govern criminal trials often do
not apply to capital sentencing hearings,30 5 courts have wide latitude
in deciding whether to admit evidence of future dangerousness at such
proceedings. Thus, actuarial and clinical evidence of future danger-
ousness has been admitted in jurisdictions following both the Daubert
and Frye standards, 306 and clinicians have been permitted to testify
even where they have not examined the defendant. David Faigman,
an expert on the use and admissibility of scientific evidence in court,
has observed that "[m]ost courts either entirely ignore evidentiary
standards for expert testimony concerning future violence, or give it
scant attention. '30 7 A brief survey of the types of evidence admitted
to show future dangerousness at capital sentencing demonstrates the
relatively unconstrained power of the courts in this context. 30 8
305 E.g., United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 494 (8th Cir. 2001); see also DAVID L.
FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES 79 &
n.10 (2002) (discussing implications of suspended or modified evidentiary standards on
predictions of future violence).
306 See, e.g., United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000) (admitting actu-
arial evidence of future dangerousness under Daubert); United States v. Rodriguez, 389 F.
Supp. 2d 1135, 1143-44 (D.N.D. 2005) (holding that psychiatric testimony regarding future
dangerousness is admissible under Daubert); State v. Endreson, 498 P.2d 454, 458 (Ariz.
1972) (in banc) (noting that sentencing court heard clinical evidence of future dangerous-
ness); Fair v. State, 161 P.3d 466, 468-69 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that trial court
found actuarial evidence of defendant's "high degree of psychopathy" to be "persuasive
and credible"). Given that Daubert was decided ten years after Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880 (1983) (discussed supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text), some have won-
dered if the Daubert decision (setting the standard of admissibility of expert testimony
under the federal rules) would actually require the exclusion of the evidence submitted in
Barefoot. While at least one federal judge thinks so, others disagree. Compare Flores v.
Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (noting that expert testi-
mony of psychiatrist regarding future dangerousness "appears [to] fail[] all five Daubert
factors"), with Barnette, 211 F.3d at 815 (admitting actuarial evidence of future dangerous-
ness), and Rodriguez, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 1143-44 (holding that psychiatric testimony
regarding future dangerousness is admissible). Moreover, virtually all of the commentary
that has addressed this question concludes that Daubert does not, in principle, preclude the
admission of "'professional assessments of dangerousness in federal courts or in states that
follow the Daubert decision."' John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific
Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 916-18 (2000)
(quoting Thomas R. Litwack & Louis B. Schlesinger, Dangerousness Risk Assessments:
Research, Legal, and Clinical Considerations, in THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSY-
CHOLOGY 171, 192-93 (Allen K. Hess & Irving B. Weinder eds., 2d ed. 1999)).
307 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 305, at 79-80 (including detailed discussion of why
courts give little weight to evidentiary standards); see also, e.g., Lee, 274 F.3d at 494
("Since the need to regulate the scope of testimony is less at the penalty phase than at the
guilt phase of trial, parties may present evidence 'as to any matter relevant to the sen-
tence.'" (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000)); Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note
295, at 1856-60 (noting "anomalous" result that evidentiary standards are stricter in civil
than criminal cases).
308 See, e.g., People v. Mertz, 842 N.E.2d 618, 653 (III. 2005) (admitting evidence that
defendant had two tattoos of Grim Reaper and another of cross surrounded by skulls, and
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Prosecutors regularly invoke diagnoses of psychopathy or antiso-
cial personality disorder in capital sentencing,30 9 likely because both
are highly correlated with recidivist violence. 310 Courts have specifi-
cally permitted both diagnoses to be introduced as evidence of future
dangerousness at the sentencing phase of capital trials.31' This has
that his email address was "Cereal Kilr 2000"); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 49 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996) (en banc) (noting testimony of prison guard "that he had seen other death row
inmates suddenly snap and become unexpectedly violent after a long periods [sic] of good
behavior"); Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (allowing
testimony of law enforcement officers, "derived from their observations of [the] defendant,
about that defendant's character and the likelihood of future violence"); Simmons v. State,
594 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc) (allowing testimony of former
county attorney that defendant was dangerous); George v. Commonwealth, 411 S.E.2d 12,
17-18 (Va. 1991) (admitting evidence that defendant had been cruel to animals twenty
years earlier).
309 See Fabian, supra note 276, at 93 ("[APD] is often present in capital cases, and is
viewed as a pejorative factor .... ); Jonathan H. Pincus, Neurologist's Role in Under-
standing Violence, 50 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 867, 868 (1993) (noting with disapproval that
every felon on death row has received APD diagnosis); see also Blume & Voisin, supra
note 160, at 74 (referring to APD as "state's preferred diagnosis").
310 See Monahan, supra note 157, at 421 & n.116 (noting that construct of psychopathy is
"now considered by some to have an 'unparalleled' ability to predict future violence in
criminal samples" and observing that "fi]n [one s]tudy, a patient with a diagnosis of antiso-
cial personality disorder was over three times more likely than a patient without such a
diagnosis to commit a violent act within several months after discharge from the hospital");
see also Grant T. Harris et al., The Construct of Psychopathy, 28 CRIME & JUST. 197,
198-99 (2001) ("Research on adult offenders has shown that psychopathic offenders are
responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime." (citations omitted)). Some experts
have argued that APD is a far less reliable proxy for future dangerousness than is psychop-
athy. See supra note 160.
311 See, e.g., Martinez v. Dretke, 99 F. App'x 538, 543-44 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that
admission of Hare Psychopathy Test did not violate defendant's due process rights); Lee,
274 F.3d at 495 (allowing government cross-examination that elicited evidence of psychop-
athy for purposes of determining future dangerousness); Barnette, 211 F.3d at 815-16
(finding PCL-R admissible under Daubert standard to show psychopathy and thus future
dangerousness); Howard v. State, 153 S.W.3d 382, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (en banc)
(affirming use of APD diagnosis as aggravating factor going to future dangerousness); Will
v. State, No. 74,306, 2004 WL 3093238, at *1-3 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2004) (finding
testimony that defendant was "psychopathic deviate" relevant to future dangerousness);
Walbey v. State, 926 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding testimony that defen-
dant "exhibited many of the characteristics of a person diagnosed with anti-social person-
ality disorder" relevant to future dangerousness); Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199,
208-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (affirming use of diagnosis of APD as aggravating
factor going to future dangerousness); Richard v. State, 842 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992) (en banc) (same); Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 619-20 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991) (en banc) (finding testimony that defendant was "most likely ... a sociopath or a
psychopath" relevant to future dangerousness); Amos v. State, 819 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (affirming use of psychiatrist's conclusion that defendant had
APD as factor going to future dangerousness); see also Charles M. Sevilla, Anti-Social
Personality Disorder: Justification for the Death Penalty?, 10 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
247, 252 n.19 (1999) (citing additional cases affirming prosecutors' use of APD diagnosis
to show future dangerousness).
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proven to be a highly effective strategy for prosecutors given that the
diagnostic criteria for each sound to the lay juror essentially like a
straightforward description of "irreparable corruption" 312 (to borrow
Justice Kennedy's phrase from Roper).3 13 More importantly, courts
do not regard either psychopathy or APD as an excusing condition for
guilt or competence; neither is thought to sufficiently diminish the
defendant's cognitive or volitional capacity for those purposes.314
Thus, either diagnosis both can have a devastating effect on the defen-
dant's mitigation claims and can create an expectation in jurors' minds
"that no rehabilitation is possible and that future criminal violence is
inevitable." 315
The diagnoses of APD and psychopathy have played a prominent
role as aggravating factors in the capital context. 316 Dr. James
Grigson, an iconic and notorious figure in the jurisprudence of future
dangerousness, serves as an extreme but illustrative example of how
government experts sometimes wield their power to make these diag-
noses. In over 140 cases,317 Dr. Grigson (often without ever having
examined the defendant) testified to the effect that "the defendant
'has a severe antisocial personality disorder and is extremely dan-
312 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
313 See Blume & Voisin, supra note 160, at 69 ("[T]o many people, and most judges, [the
diagnosis of APD] means that the defendant is little more than a remorseless sociopath.").
314 See Abbott, supra note 176, at 296 (observing that no jurisdiction accepts diagnoses
of psychopathy as basis for diminished capacity).
315 Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 159, at 333; see also Blume & Voisin, supra note
160, at 69 (calling APD diagnosis "the kiss of death").
316 For example, the APA brief in Roper further underscores both the value of an APD
or psychopathy diagnosis to prosecutors seeking the death penalty and the risk of misdiag-
noses. The APA brief argued that there was an unacceptably high risk that teenagers
would be misdiagnosed with APD or psychopathy and wrongly sentenced to death as a
result. APA Brief, supra note 159, at 20. It asserted that adolescents' dynamic and
unstable personalities render it impossible to accurately diagnose APD or psychopathy at
that stage of development. Id. at 19-22; see also id. at 9-12 (describing changes in adoles-
cent brain prior to maturity). The risk that juries might erroneously conclude that an ado-
lescent capital defendant is a psychopath is compounded by the fact that many of the
transitory antisocial personality traits of teenagers overlap with those of the psychopath,
including "proneness to boredom, impulsivity, irresponsibility, failure to accept responsi-
bility for one's actions, and unstable interpersonal relationships." Id. at 22. In the Roper
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy reprised this view, finding that jurors should not be
asked to determine whether a juvenile capital defendant's crime "reflects unfortunate yet
transient immaturity" or "irreparable corruption." Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. Justice
Kennedy noted further that he shared the APA's worry that adolescents might be misdiag-
nosed with APD and psychopathy. See id. (noting that DSM-IV forbids psychiatrists from
diagnosing patients younger than eighteen with APD).
317 Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of "Future Dangerousness"
Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho, 37 AKRON L.
REV. 469, 481 (2004).
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
gerous and will commit future acts of violence."' 318 In the seminal
case of Barefoot v. Estelle,319 he testified with "reasonable psychiatric
certainty" that Barefoot fell in the "most severe category" of soci-
opaths and that Barefoot would, with "one hundred percent and abso-
lute" certainty, commit future criminal acts, constituting a continuing
threat to society. 320 Prosecutors often reprise these arguments
directly or raise them in response to mitigation claims of
nondangerousness (in those few jurisdictions that prohibit the predic-
tion of dangerousness in the prosecution's aggravation case-in-
chief).321
Studies have shown that capital juries often regard evidence of
future dangerousness as the most important aggravating factor in their
sentencing calculus. Indeed, two commentators have noted that
"Future dangerousness takes precedence in jury deliberations over
any mitigating evidence, such as remorse, mental illness, intelligence,
or drug/alcohol addiction, and any concern about the defendant's
behavior in prison. ' 322 In fact, it has been observed that even in those
jurisdictions that do not explicitly direct the capital jury to consider
future dangerousness as an aggravating factor, jurors do so anyway.323
C. The Marriage of Dr. Grigson and Lady Wootton
As Paul Robinson has observed, within the context of sentencing,
desert and dangerousness inevitably conflict as distributive criteria:
"To advance one, the system must sacrifice the other. The irreconcil-
able differences reflect the fact that prevention and desert seek to
318 Blume & Voisin, supra note 160, at 69 (quoting Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249,
253 (1988)). For a provocative profile of Grigson, see Ron Rosenbaum, Travels with Dr.
Death, VANITY FAIR, May 1990, at 140, as reprinted in NINA RIVKIND & STEVEN F.
SCHATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY 513 (2d ed. 2005).
319 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
320 Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting from trial transcript); see also Barefoot
v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875, 887-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (describing Grigson's testimony);
Regnier, supra note 317, at 480-81 (same).
321 See Sevilla, supra note 311, at 252 n.19 (1999) (citing cases).
322 Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 295, at 1897; see also APA Brief, supra
note 159, at 18-19 (noting empirical research showing extreme significance attached by
juries to finding of "future dangerousness," including studies finding that "85% of juries
between 1974 and 1988 refusing to impose death penalty failed to find future dangerous-
ness of defendant" and that "future dangerousness ranked second only to crime itself in
attention given in jury's penalty phase deliberations, overshadowing evidence presented in
mitigation").
323 See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 295, at 1897-98 ("But whether or not
future dangerousness... is even mentioned by prosecutors or presented as evidence in the
penalty phase of the case, it remains the major focus of the factfinders."); John H. Blume et
al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue," 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397,
398-99 (2001) (finding future dangerousness is on minds of most capital jurors "no matter
what the prosecution says or does not say").
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achieve different goals. Incapacitation concerns itself with the
future-avoiding future crimes. Desert concerns itself with the past-
allocating punishment for past offenses. ' 324 The thrust-and-parry of
this conflict is played out in dramatic fashion in the capital context.
On the one hand, capital defendants introduce mitigating evidence to
diminish their moral culpability, thus seeking a final refuge in the con-
cept of retribution. On the other, the prosecution tenders evidence of
future dangerousness, trying to stoke the consequentialist fears of the
jury about violent acts that the defendant might commit if he is not
permanently incapacitated by execution. In capital sentencing, pure
consequentialism is the gravest threat to the defendant's life, while
appeals to retributive justice are often his last, and best, hope.
The long-term aspiration of cognitive neuroscience decisively
resolves this conflict between desert and crime control in favor of the
latter by removing any consideration of diminished culpability. In so
doing, the long-term scheme eliminates the last safe haven for a cap-
ital defendant whose sanity, capacity for the requisite mens rea, com-
petence, and guilt are no longer at issue. Thus, in a final ironic twist,
once retribution is replaced with a regime single-mindedly concerned
with the prediction of crime and the incapacitation of criminals, the
only possible use in capital sentencing of the neuroimaging research
on the roots of criminal violence is to demonstrate the aggravating
factor of future dangerousness.
Imagine for a moment how a jury concerned solely with avoiding
future harms would regard an fMRI or PET image that purported to
show the biological causes of a nonexcusing disposition to criminal
violence. Likely, neuroimaging would radically amplify, in the minds
of jurors, the aggravating effect of a diagnosis of APD or psychopathy.
In a sentencing system that focused the jury's deliberation solely on
the question of identifying and preventing crime, the work of the cog-
nitive neuroscience project's architects would be transformed from a
vehicle for seeking mercy into a tool that counsels the imposition of
death.
It is only through the lens of just deserts that such evidence could
possibly be regarded as mitigating. This conclusion is bolstered by
capital defense experts who have observed that "Evidence of neuro-
logical impairment .... can be devastatingly damaging to the case for
life. In presenting such evidence to a jury, counsel must be careful to
avoid creating the impression that the defendant is 'damaged goods'
324 Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1441 (2001).
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and beyond repair. '325 In the regime contemplated by the long-term
aspiration-where claims of diminished culpability are untenable-
this is the only permissible inference that jurors can draw. Arguing
for compassion or leniency in such a system would be as nonsensical
as seeking mercy for a dangerously defective car on its way to the
junkyard to be crushed into scrap metal. Reconciliation and forgive-
ness are not useful concepts as applied to soulless cars; they are only
intelligible as applied to sinners.
The grave implications of the long-term aspiration for capital sen-
tencing come into even sharper relief when one considers the role that
retributive justice has played in modern death penalty jurisprudence.
Contrary to the intuitions of the project's architects, retribution has
served as a crucial limiting principle on capital sentencing. The
Supreme Court itself has referred to a "narrowing jurisprudence" of
just deserts,326 which limits the ultimate punishment to "a narrow cat-
egory of the most serious crimes" and defendants "whose extreme cul-
pability makes them 'the most deserving of execution.'1, 327 In the
name of retributive justice, the Court has barred the execution of
mentally retarded defendants,328 defendants who were under the age
of eighteen when their offense was committed,329 rapists,330 and
defendants convicted of felony murder who did not actually kill or
attempt to kill the victim. 331 In each instance, the Court ruled that
such defendants were not eligible for the death penalty because such
punishment would be categorically disproportionate to their personal
culpability.332 These same results could not have been reached if
deterrence were the sole animating principle guiding the Court: gen-
eral deterrence-i.e., whether the death penalty for a specific offense
or a specific class of offenders will reduce crime overall-may be a
contested issue. However, specific deterrence is always advanced by
325 Burt, supra note 288.
326 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
327 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting id.).
328 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 ("We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally
retarded criminals will measurably advance ...the retributive purpose of the death
penalty.").
329 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 ("Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a sub-
stantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.").
330 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("We have concluded that a sentence of
death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is
therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.").
331 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) ("Putting Enmund to death to avenge
two killings that he did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does not
measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just
deserts.").
332 See supra notes 326-30 and accompanying text.
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the execution of a defendant, since execution guarantees that the
same defendant will not cause future harm.
One might be tempted to think that without the engine of retribu-
tion, the political will to continue a regime of capital punishment will
wither away. In fact, the average voter's desire for retribution has
been blamed for the continued existence of capital punishment in the
United States. 333 But a review of recent political rhetoric on the death
penalty contradicts this conclusion, suggesting that politicians prefer
to couch their public arguments in terms of deterrence. For example,
in one of the presidential debates of the 2000 election, Vice President
Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush agreed that the only reason
to support the death penalty was for its deterrent effects:
MODERATOR: Do both of you believe the death penalty actually
deters crime? ...
BUSH: I do. It's the only reason to be for it.... I don't think you
should support the death penalty to seek revenge. I don't think
that's right. I think the reason to support the death penalty is
because it saves other people's lives.
GORE: I think it is a deterrent. I know that's a controversial view,
but I do believe it's a deterrent. 334
More recently, in an article describing the recent efforts on the
part of various states to expand the death penalty to a wider array of
offenses, every politician quoted cited deterrence as the sole motiva-
tion for the initiatives. 335 It has further been observed that empirical
studies purporting to show the deterrent effect of the death penalty
have had a profound impact on the Supreme Court and the lay public
by casting the death penalty as a life-saving institution.336 Finally, and
perhaps most powerfully, the importance of deterrence is apparent
from the aforementioned social science evidence, which shows that
the aggravating factor of "future dangerousness" is the second-most
decisive consideration (next to the fact of the underlying crime itself)
333 See Kirchmeier, supra note 279, at 640 (describing opinion of Professor James
Whitman that ordinary voters are incapable of "'the kind of routinized, sober, and merciful
approach to punishment that is the stuff of the daily work of punishment professionals"'
(quoting JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 55 (2003))).
334 The Third Gore-Bush Presidential Debate (Oct. 17, 2000), http://www.debates.org/
pages/trans2000c.html (emphasis added).
335 Emily Bazar, Wider Death Penalty Sought; At Least Six States Buck U.S. Trend, USA
TODAY, Feb. 7, 2007, at Al.
336 See generally Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal
Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 257-61 (2006) (describing
and critiquing original studies and "new wave" of dozen or more studies seeking to defend
death penalty on deterrence grounds).
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for jurors contemplating the imposition of a death sentence. 337 Thus,
in actual deliberations, it is nearly certain that jurors privilege the
question of deterrence above almost all other factors.
In fact, the widely shared intuition that seems to be motivating
the long-term aspiration-namely, that retributive justice is the pri-
mary source of the brutality and harshness of the modern American
criminal justice system 338-may generally be misguided. Many fea-
tures of the criminal justice system that are frequently criticized as
draconian and inhumane are, in fact, motivated by a purely conse-
quentialist crime-control rationale. Such measures include laws that
authorize life sentences for recidivists (e.g., "three strikes" laws), laws
that reduce the age at which offenders can be tried as adults, laws that
punish gang membership, laws that require the registration of sex
offenders, laws that dramatically increase sentences by virtue of past
history, and, most paradigmatically, laws that provide for the involun-
tary civil commitment of sexual offenders who show difficulty control-
ling their behavior. 339 These laws are the progeny of the principle
animating the long-term aspiration, and some are worrisome examples
of its possible implications.
Paul Robinson has offered a provocative genealogy for such laws
that provides further grounds for caution. He makes a powerful argu-
ment that abandoning retributive justice in favor of consequentialist
values of rehabilitation laid the groundwork for the draconian mea-
sures described above. According to Robinson's account, once "the
limited ability of social and medical science to rehabilitate offenders
became clear," reformers tried to salvage what was left of the conse-
quentialist project by turning to incapacitation as the principle means
of avoiding future crimes.340 He concludes that "the harshness of the
337 See supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
338 See, e.g., Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commuta-
tion of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407,
410-13 (2005) ("Countless cases in the Supreme Court equate retributivism with revenge
or the desire to make criminals suffer or both .... [Viarious commentators reflexively
embrace this view . ."); Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification 2-3, 3 n.5
(Dec. 15, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956610
("Retributivists are said to be unable to make clear either why wrongdoers deserve to
suffer or why it is permissible for a state institution to inflict suffering even if deserved.
They are also deplored as savage or barbaric."). For a defense of retribution as the "only
genuine and justified form of punishment" that rejects the notion that it is synonymous
with vengeance and argues that retribution is a mechanism for restoring equality between
wrongdoers and law-abiding citizens, see John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment's Formative
Aim, 44 Am. J. JURIS. 91, 102 (1999).
339 See Robinson, supra note 324, at 1429-31 & nn.2-7 (citing statutes and legislative
history making clear that all such laws are primarily oriented towards prediction and con-
trol of future crime).
340 Id. at 1449.
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current system may be attributed in largest part to the move to reha-
bilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence, which disconnected criminal
punishment from the constraint of just desert."341
H.L.A. Hart's critique of Lady Wootton's project offers a similar
cautionary note for the long-term aspiration. Hart himself was deeply
skeptical about retribution as a general justifying aim of punishment,
but he nevertheless recognized its importance as a limiting distributive
principle on Wootton's purely forward-looking consequentialist con-
cerns.342 As Hart recognized, a criminal justice system that is both
single-mindedly committed to the prediction and prevention of antiso-
cial behavior and self-consciously unconcerned with the mitigating
effects of personal blameworthiness (or lack thereof) creates powerful
incentives for the government to engage in highly intrusive
behavior.343
Paul Robinson points to the possibility that "if incapacitation of
the dangerous were the only distributive principle, there would be
little reason to wait until an offense were committed to impose crim-
inal liability and sanctions; it would be more effective to screen the
general population and 'convict' those found dangerous and in need
of incapacitation. ' 344 Indeed, the short-term project-using cognitive
neuroscience to identify the roots of criminal violence-may someday
create novel and powerful opportunities to interfere with individual
liberty. Herbert Packer's words seem eerily prescient in light of this
possibility:
[A] purely preventive view, reinforced as that view is today by a
scientific and deterministic attitude toward the possibilities for con-
trolling human conduct, carries the danger that single-minded pur-
suit of the goal of crime prevention will slight and in the end defeat
the ultimate goal of law in a free society, which is to liberate rather
than to restrain....
... The more confidently we can predict behavior and the more
subtly we can control it, the more powerful will be the temptation to
relax the constraints that inhibit us at present from aggressively
341 Robinson, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 281, at 14.
342 See Hart, supra note 267, at 1328-29 (arguing that retribution is consistent with, and
curtails potential unfairness of, Wootton's deterrence theory).
343 See HART, supra note 1, at 181-82 ("Whereas a system from which responsibility was
eliminated... would leave each individual not only less able to exclude the future interfer-
ence by the law with his life, but also less able to foresee the times of the law's interfer-
ence."); Hart, supra note 267, at 1330 ("If the doctrine of mens rea was no longer a
necessary condition for convictions the occasions for official interferences in our lives
would be vastly increased.").
344 Robinson, supra note 324, at 1439-40.
Reprinted With The Permission of New York University School of Law
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
intervening in the lives of individuals in the name of crime
prevention.345
Questions of whether a given individual poses a continuing threat
to society are central to the criminal justice system. In addition to
capital sentencing, fact finders are charged with making such determi-
nations in the context of noncapital sentencing, civil commitment
hearings, parole and probation hearings, pretrial detention, and invol-
untary civil commitment of sexual offenders. 346 Regardless of
neuroimaging's capacity or incapacity to predict criminal behavior
reliably, there is already a powerful demand for the use of such tech-
niques in crime control. Moreover, far more controversial methods
for predicting future social harms have already been accepted by the
Supreme Court in the capital sentencing context. This problem would
be dramatically aggravated by adopting a criminal framework that
places an even higher premium on the prediction and prevention of
violence than the present one does.
D. Objections and Responses
One can anticipate the rejoinders that the architects of the cogni-
tive neuroscience project might raise in response to the above critique.
First, they might argue that the short-term theory of mitigation does
not depend on just deserts, but rather it depends on the notion that
the rationale of deterrence underlying the death penalty is inappli-
cable to defendants with brain defects or personality disorders. Next,
they might retort that this critique fails to recognize that the aim of
the long-term aspiration is not incapacitation, but rehabilitation.
Finally, they might argue that the prediction of a draconian, inhu-
mane, and invasive system of criminal law will not come to pass as a
result of their efforts because society simply would not accept it; the
revulsion and fear that citizens would feel toward such a system would
not be tolerated. Each of these arguments will be taken in turn.
Cognitive neuroscientists may defend the use of neuroimaging
evidence for mitigation by attempting to ground the concept of miti-
gation in the consequentialist value of deterrence rather than in just
deserts. They likely would argue that capital punishment cannot deter
individuals with certain types of brain abnormalities, and so
presenting evidence of these abnormalities merely shows that there is
no deterrence rationale for imposing a death sentence on such individ-
345 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 66 (1968).
346 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 305, at 78 (discussing wide variety of contexts in
which expert testimony concerning future behavior is relevant); Slobogin, supra note 298,
at 1-2 (listing ways in which "[d]angerousness determinations permeate the government's
implementation of its police power").
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uals. In fact, Greene and Cohen take this very approach in their argu-
ments in favor of retaining certain excuse defenses (such as
diminished capacity, infancy, insanity, and duress) because there is no
deterrence value in punishing people in circumstances where such
excuses apply.347 This argument is essentially the same as Bentham's
response to Blackstone regarding the permissible excusing conditions
for criminal acts. 348 Blackstone argued that the excusing defenses
"may be reduced to this single consideration: the want or defect of
will," and that "a vitious will" is a prerequisite to criminal liability. 349
Bentham retorted that the excusing defenses were not rooted in this
notion of blameworthiness and just deserts but, rather, were a recog-
nition that punishing "the mad, the infant child or those who break
the law unintentionally or under duress or even under 'necessity' must
be inefficacious" because such offenders are inherently
undeterrable. 350
This argument fails to provide an alternative, consequentialist
justification for the short-term aspiration's theory of mitigation for at
least two reasons. First, the argument is, as H.L.A. Hart noted, a
"spectacular non sequitur.' '351 It purports to claim that offenders with
a brain defect or personality disorder are not deterrable by the threat
of the death penalty. It is possible that, as Hart pointed out, the inflic-
tion of the punishment might nevertheless "secure a higher measure
of conformity to law on the part of normal persons than is secured by
the admission of excusing conditions," thus increasing the overall
amount of crime control for society.35 2 In addition, it is obvious that a
death sentence will be effective as a specific deterrent on the convicted
offender.
347 Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1783.
348 See HART, supra note 1, at 18-19 & nn.21-22 (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 13, 9 & n.2 (Prometheus
Books 1988) (1781); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *20-21) (discussing
Bentham's reply to Blackstone on excusing conditions for criminal acts).
349 Id. at 18 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 348, at *20-21).
350 Id. at 19 (citing BENTHAM, supra note 348, at ch. 13, $$ 9, 11).
351 Id.
352 Id. One is reminded by this argument of the hypothetical conversation between
Oliver Wendell Holmes and the condemned man who claims he could not help himself in
committing a capital offense:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged (or
electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you
but to make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the
common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if
you like. But the law must keep its promises.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Dec. 17, 1925), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI
806 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
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But an attempt to ground the short-term aspiration's theory of
mitigation in this way fails for a more fundamental reason: the law of
capital sentencing does not presently accept the proposition that
defendants who are afflicted by the kinds of conditions that cognitive
neuroscientists invoke in mitigation (e.g., hypoactivity of the
prefrontal lobe, APD, or psychopathy) are undeterrable. 353 Sen-
tencing law does not accept (nor do the mitigation experts argue) that
these conditions preclude appreciation of one's actions, conformity
with the law, or formation of the requisite mens rea. If the law did
accept this claim, such defendants would prevail at the guilt stage of
their trials and would not face sentencing. Bentham and Blackstone's
debate, after all, was about using excuse defenses to guilt; by defini-
tion, mitigation claims raised at the sentencing phase of a capital trial
are moot for that purpose.
It does not seem possible, under present capital sentencing cate-
gories, to characterize the theory of mitigation invoked by cognitive
neuroscientists under the short-term aspiration as anything other than
an argument for diminished culpability rooted in the overarching dis-
tributive principle of just deserts. That being so, the long-term and
short-term aspirations, as argued above, remain at loggerheads.
Next, the defenders of the cognitive neuroscience project might
argue that the project is aimed at rehabilitation and not mere incapac-
itation-that is, it aspires to bring about a regime of "therapeutic jus-
tice." This argument also fails to rescue the project, both for
principled and prudential reasons. First, it is not clear how a regime
devoted solely to avoiding future harms to society compels the pursuit
of rehabilitation for offenders, except perhaps on economic efficiency
grounds. It cannot be because neurologically defective defendants
deserve a punishment less than death due to their diminished culpa-
bility, since this would be an appeal to retribution. Moreover, for
offenders with the neurological conditions associated with a predispo-
sition to criminal violence, rehabilitation may very well prove impos-
sible. Future prospects of rehabilitation for those laboring under one
such condition-psychopathy-seem quite bleak, according to the
conventional wisdom of the mental health community.35 4 (Indeed,
353 For a thoughtful critique of the present state of the law proposing and arguing for a
way in which criminal law's "voluntary act" requirement can take into account develop-
ments in the science of consciousness, see Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness:
Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 274-75 (2002). For a critique arguing
for the development of "neurojurisprudence," allowing for a defense that the defendant
suffered from frontal lobe damage causing a lack of behaviorial control, see Redding,
supra note 208, at 53.
354 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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therein lies its persuasive force as an aggravating factor, as Justice
Kennedy observed in Roper.)355 As Robinson has observed, once just
deserts has been eliminated as a legitimate distributive principle of
punishment and therapies for criminal misconduct have proven
unavailing, societies often turn to incapacitation as the sole animating
value of the criminal law. 356
Finally, cognitive neuroscientists might claim that the draconian
capital sentencing regime predicted above will not come to pass as a
result of the cognitive neuroscience project because the public would
not stand for it. Put another way, they might argue that such a regime,
even if it were the logical outgrowth of widely held beliefs, would gen-
erate too much social disapproval to be justified under consequen-
tialist principles. Greene and Cohen make this argument in response
to the possible claim that their vision for the criminal law would pro-
duce massive overpunishing. They argue, by way of example, that
society would not tolerate the inhumanity of executing parking-law
violators. 357
There are two powerful responses to this argument. First, this
Article is a critique of the cognitive neuroscience project for capital
sentencing, not for the criminal law more generally. Capital defen-
dants are arguably the most hated and feared members of society. It
is unlikely that there would be substantial social discontent with a
regime that was geared toward the permanent incapacitation of such
individuals. For better or worse, there is not widespread opposition to
the execution of defendants who are factually and legally guilty, sane,
competent, and with the requisite mens rea, yet who present
neuroimaging evidence suggesting that they have a neurological con-
dition or personality disorder that inclines them (if not irresistibly)
towards murderous acts. The continued successful invocation of APD
and psychopathy as aggravating factors by prosecutors, and the sub-
stantial number of defendants claiming frontal lobe dysfunction who
have nevertheless been sentenced to death, illustrates that our society
is (again, for better or worse) quite comfortable executing such
individuals.358
Second, even if there were widespread societal discomfort with
executing those whose brains make them incorrigibly violent, this
would not prevent such executions under Greene and Cohen's frame-
work. Rather, this anxiety could be explained away as a function of
355 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (referring implicitly to APD and
psychopathy (or sociopathy) as "irreparable corruption").
356 Robinson, supra note 324, at 1447-49.
357 Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1783.
358 See supra note 215.
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the irrational dichotomy between "him" and "his brain," that the cog-
nitive neuroscience project deplores. As Greene and Cohen argue,
using an appealing fiction (such as free will) may be acceptable for
decisions relating to small things, just as having faith in Euclid and
Newton is safe when negotiating the aisles of the grocery store. 35 9 But
in matters as important as capital sentencing, Greene and Cohen
would argue that we must have the courage to abandon such fictions
and embrace the truths of cognitive neuroscience-just as we must
turn to Lobachevsky and Einstein when we want to launch a rocket
into space. 360
CONCLUSION
This Article has essayed to identify, articulate, and take seriously
what appears to be an emerging project within the cognitive neuros-
cience community to reform capital sentencing. It concludes that,
while the goals of making capital sentencing more rational and
humane are laudable, the project itself is ill-conceived. Its impact
likely will be the opposite of what it seeks because the project's short-
and long-term goals are intractably opposed to one another. Its short-
term aspiration depends on the very doctrine of just deserts that its
long-term vision seeks to dismantle. The long-term aspiration seeks
to bring about a criminal justice regime that is oriented solely towards
the consequentialist goal of avoiding future harms. In such a regime,
the singular focus of the criminal law becomes the prediction and pre-
vention of criminal acts. But we know from painful experience that
the extant mechanisms in the capital sentencing regime that are cali-
brated to do this sort of work-most notably, the aggravating factor of
future dangerousness-are no friend to the capital defendant. In fact,
they are often the gravest threat to his life. In the context of death
penalty sentencing, defendants often find that their only refuge is an
appeal for leniency based on a claim of diminished personal responsi-
bility, a claim that is founded squarely on the retributive principle that
the long-term approach repudiates.
What can be done in the face of this difficulty? Is it possible or
desirable to salvage the cognitive neuroscience project in a way that
will preserve its humanitarian ends? Or is the reductive materialist
account of human personhood and human agency posited by cognitive
neuroscience-and, indeed, by modern science more generally-
359 Greene & Cohen, supra note 57, at 1784.
360 See id. ("[There] may be special situations, analogous to those routinely encountered
by 'rocket scientists', in which the counter-intuitive truth that we legitimately ignore most
of the time can and should be acknowledged.").
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incommensurable with the account on which the criminal law is pre-
mised? These are questions for another day. The aim of this Article
has been to lay the groundwork for such future discussions by
exploring the implications and unintended consequences of the pro-
ject as presently conceived. Understanding where an argument leads
in principle and practice is a necessary precursor to appraising its
wisdom-an appraisal that is particularly essential when human lives
hang in the balance.
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